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Postschool  training  offers significant  benefits  for private  sector
wage employees. Job-based  and postsecondary  training in-
crease  wages  by 10  and 20 percent,  respectively.  But workers
with lmited formal  schooling  are unlikely  to get job training,
revealing  that  training  and  formal  education  are  complementary
investments  in Peru.
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Data  on job training  offered  to urban  males in  rates. Job-based  training  increases  wage rates
Peru since  the 1960s  support  these findings:  more  than 10 pecent; training  from postsecon-
dary programs,  20 percent;  and trawning  from
The heaviest  enrollment  is in job-based  "academes"  seems to have  no impact  on wage
raining  prgrams  - on-the-job  or off-the-job  rates. Postschool  training  appears  not to affect
programs  offered  by public  sector  institutions.  the earnings  or proLts of self-employed  workers,
TMe  second  heaviest  enrollment  - contrary  to  after  controll;ng  for such  factors  as enterprise
common  expectations  - is in "academes,"  the  characteristics,  formal  schooling,  and the
prototypical  proprietary  (for-profit)  training  probability  of having  received  training  in school.
organizations.
[This  report  is the first evaluation  of the
The probability  of receiving  training  is  patterns  of participation  in, and outcomes  of, the
largely  determined  by educational  attainment.  postschool  job training  that begar, Ti  Peru in the
In general,  workers  with less-than-secondary  1960S.  Conclusions  are  based on analysis  of
educaCion  - more than  half of Peru's urban  data on a sample  of 1,259  wage workers  in the
male labor  force  - do not receive  job skills  private sector  and 925 self-employed  nonfarm
from institutional  training  programs. Only  workers  - all urban men between  the ages of 15
workers  who  attain  secondary  schooling  or  and 65-  drawn  from the Peruvian  Living
higher  are likely to get job training. So workers  Standards  Survey. The study results  suggest  that
with limited  schooling  also face  limited  training  investments  in training  offer significant  benefits
opportunities.  in salaried  employment  in the private  sector,  but
because  training  costs were unavailable,  the
Tmining  increases  salaried  workers'  wage  study is only a partial  evaluation.)
This paper  is a product  of the Education  and Employment  Division,  Population  and
Human  Resources  Department.  Copies  are  available  free  from  the World  Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington  DC 20433. Please  contact  Cynthia  Cristobal,  room S6-
001, extension  33640.
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A critical  bottleneck  for  economic  development  is the  lack  of
qualified  human  resources. In order  to ease  this  constraint,  most  developing
countries  have  invested  heavily  in  education  and  training  in recent  decades.
Government  training  programs  outside  the  formal  education  system  have  at least
three  general  objectives.  First,  they  aim  to eliminate  shortages  of skilled
workers  by upgrading  the  labor  force. Second,  they  aim  to reduce  inequality.
Third,  they  aim  to augment  the  stock  of  h-uman  capital  available  for  economic
development,  thereby  raising  the  earnings  and  probability  of  employment  of
trainees. Accordingly,  one  of  the  indicators  of the  success  of these  programs
is that  the  earnings  of the  trainees  increase  above  what they  would  have
increased  without  training  (Ashenfelter,  1979,.
Since  the  late  1960s  Peruvian  governments  have  placed  considerable
emphasis  on education  in  order  to improve  the  quantity  and  quality  of  human
resources  available  for  economic  development.  Policies  aimed  at the  promotion
of  worker  training  were  based  on  the  belief  that  investments  in  job-training
would  enhance  productivity  and  therefore  earnings  of the  new  entrants  to  the
lalbor  force,  as  well  as those  already  employed. These  policies  were
implemented  through  the  establishment  of several  sectoral  training
institutions  attached  to  various  agencies  in  the  public  sector  and  financed
by payroll  and  sales  taxes. In addition,  technical  institutes,  universities,
and  proprietary  institutions  developed  their  own  training  programs  during  the
1970s  and  1980s.
This  report  presents  the  first  evaluation  of the  outcomes  of the
Peruvian  training  sector  since  its  outset  in  the  1960s. The  paper  examines
the  private  returns  to  post-school  training  among  male  wage  and  non-farm  self-
employed  workers  in the  urban  areas  of  Peru.  In  particular,  this  study  focus
on two  issues: First,  who are  the  recipients  of  post-school  training,  and
what are  the  determinants  of  participation  in  post-school  training? Second,
what is the  impact  of  job-training  on the  wages  of  employees  and  self-employed
workers? Analyses  of  patterns  and  determinants  of  training  participation
offer  important  information  to  policymakers  on the  particular  groups
benefiting  from  training,  on the  groups  with  no access  to training,  and  on the
potential  client  populations  of policies  that  establish  or  expand  alternative
training  schemes. From  the  point  of  view  of society  as a  whole,  any
government  training  program  uses resources  that  could  be allocated  for  other
purjposes.  The  direct  benefit  of training  investments  to society  might  be
represented  by additional  output  available  because  of the  increased
productivity  of participants  in  training  programs. Earnings  can  be used  as a
proxy  of  workers  productivity,  and  estimates  of the  returns  to training  can  be
used  as a  cri  terion to  approximate  the  benefits  of training  programs  in  the
labor  marketl-. In addition,  these  analyses  may in£orm  policymakers  whether
1l  A number  of criticisms  have  been levied  against  the  use  of
quantitative  analysis  to examine  the  external  effects  of training  programs.
First,  that  joint  evaluation  of different  programs  is  undesirable  because  it
implies  aggregation  of Lraining  programs  which  are  likely  to  have different
labor  market  impacts. The  differences  between  programs  are said  to  be crucial
because  training  programs  not  only  include  several  types  of instruction,  but
also  different  proportions  of academic  and  technical  training  which  are  likely-2-
formal  schooling  and  post-school  training  are  complements  or substitutes  in
raising  workers'  productivity.
The results  of the  Peruvian  Living  Standards  Survey  (PLSS)  reveal
that 'post-schooll  training  activities  are  widespread  in  the  Peruvian  labor
force. About  14 percent  of all  Peruvian  workers  between  15 and  65 years  of
age  reported  attendance  at eome  sort  of occupational  training  course. Among
males,  significant  variation  in  job-training  participation  according  to sector
of employment  was found. Thus,  42  percent  of public  sector  employees  reported
training  courses  compared  to 26  percent  of  private  sector  employees.  Among
those  self-employed  in  non-agricultural  activities,  15 percent  declared  post-
school  training  courses.
In the  Latin  American  context,  there  are  very  few  quantitative
evaluations  of the  economic  impact  of  job-training  programs. Research  on  the
effects  of Colombia's  in-service  training,  SENA,21  indicates  a positive  effect
of training  on the  earnings  of  men in  wage employment,  and  complementarity
between  investments  in job-training  and  other  forms  of  human  capital
investment  such  as schooling  and  experience  (Jimenez  and  Kugler  1986,  1987,
Horn  1987).
The  Data
The  data  for  this  study  came  from  the  Peruvian  Living  Standards
Survey  (PLSS)3V. The  survey  gathered  information  on the  post-school  training
activities  of respondents  14 years  of age  and  older. In this  paper,  urban  men
15  to 65  years  old  were  classified  into  wage  or non-farm  self-employment
according  to the  activity  they  reported  as the  main  job in  the  seven  days
prior  to the  survey. This  job  was defined  as the  occupation  in  which  the
interviewed  worked  "more  hours  in  that  past  week'  without  using  any 'earningsf
criterion. Wage  workers  are  those  private  sector  employees  who reported
positive  hours  of  work  as  well as  positive  earnings  during  the  week  prior  to
the  interview.  The  self-employed  workers  are  those  who reported  income  from  a
business  during  the  week  prior  to the  interview,  as  well  as information  on the
assets,  revenues,  and  expenditures  of that  business. There  are  1,259  wage
workers  and  925  self-employed  individuals  in  the  sample. Overall,  these  two
to  have different  impacts  on short-term  productivity.  Second,  and
specifically  concerning  the  earnings  functions  approach,  it  has  been said  that
these  studies  fail  to  account  for  selectivity  bias,  and  use  earnings  horizons
too  close  to  the  period  of training  to detect  the  training  effect  (Dougherty
1986). This study  controls  for  selectivity  ana  uses  a sample  of individuals
who received  training  during  a ten  year  period.
2/  SENA  stands  for  Servicio  Nacional  de  Aprendizaje.
3/  This  survey  was conducted  by The  World  Bank  and  Instituto  Nacional
de  Estadistica  under  a  World  Bank  Research  Project  (RPO  673-26),  between  June
1985  and  July  1986. The  survey  collected  information  on the  resources
available  to 5,000  households  as  well  as socioeconomic  information  on their
27,000  household  members.- 3 -
groups  account  for  50 percent  of the  male labor  force  in Peru (World  Bank-
Instituto  Nacional  de Estadistica,  December  1986).
Stelcner.  et.  al., (1987)  showed  that  the  Peruvian  wage labor  market
is  heterogeneous.  Considerable  differences  wqre  detected  among  private  sector
workers  in  Lima  and  Other  Urban  Areas  (OUAs)4  . The  observed  pattern
indicates  that  wage rates  and  the  level  of educational  attainment  of salaried
workers  decrease  as the  degree  of urbanization  diminishes.  However,  with
regard  to occupational  training,  male  workers  exhibit  similar  levels  of
activity  in  both  locations. Therefore,  in  this  paper,  the  analysis  is  carried
out  jointly  for  Lima  and  OUAs,  excluding  workers  in rural  areas  where  post-
school  training  activities  are  very  limited.
The  training  information  is  based  on reported  attendance  in any
"occupational  training'  program-/. This  includes  information  on the  longest
training  event  attended-6,  the  type  of institution  providing  that  training,
the  year  taken,  the  hours  attended,  and  the  diplomas  obtained. The  small
number  of  wage and  self-employed  workers  in  training  courses  at the  time  of
the  survey  did  not  allow  focus  on current  job-training.  In fact,  sample  size
considerations  prevented  analysis  for  separate  vintages  of trainees. Given
the  ob4ectives  of this  paper,  the  sample  of trainees  is restricted  to those
individuals  who received  training  after  1975,  period  in  which  most trainirng
programs  were already  established  and  in  operation.  Also,  most  of the
training  reported  in  the  survey  took  place  since  the  mid-1970s'/. The  PLSS
information  on the  type  of institution  providing  training  (where  the  training
was  obtained)  includes  the  most important  programs  in  existence  ranging  from
off-the-job  or  on-the-job  training  and  in-service  training  programs,  technical
institutes,  and  university  "continuing  education"  programs,  to proprietary
training  centers  'academes".  Self-reported  training  measures  are  not  wholly
reliable  since  they  tend  to  understate  how  much  training  has  been  received
througwh  failure  to report  the  more informal  kinds  of training.
Shortcomings  of  the  PLSS  data  for  this  analysis  are  that  the survey
does  not include  information  on the  particular  training  programs  and  their
content  (e.g.  managerial,  skilled  manual,  clerical),  that  it  records  only  the
longest  training  period,  and  that  it  is  unknown  whether  this  training  is  used
in  the  current  job.  This  implies  that  in this  analysis  it  is assumed  that  the
4/  Lima includes  metropolitan  Lima (capital  city)  and  the  Callao
province. OUAs  include  other  urban  settlements  with  more than  2,000
inhabitants.
5/  That is,  those  who reported  having  taken  a  course  to learn  an
occupational  skill  (capacitacion  ocupacional),  in any  training  program  offered
by a  public  or private  training  institution  outside  the  school  system.
6/  Defined  in terms  of total  hours  of training. That  is,  the  training
program  where  the  respondent  received  the  most  hours  of training.
7/  Seventy-three  percent  and  65  percent  of all  reported  job-training
took  place  after  1975  in  Lima  and  OUAs,  respectively.-4-
recorded  event  is  the  one  affecting  the  labor  market  outccnmea  of training
observed  at the  time  of the  survey. Nevertheless,  this  is a  national
household  survey  which  contains  a representative  sample  of the  Peruvian
salaried  and self-employed  workers. Therefore,  it  permits  one  not  only  to  map
out  the  patterns  of  occupational  training  observed  among  these  groups  of the
labor  force,  but  also  provides  useful  insights  into  workers'  behakrior
regarding  acquisition  of skills  outside  the  formal  education  system.
The  analysis  applies  a straightforward  earnings-participation
approach  based  on the  wage  model  adjusted  for  self-selection  developed  by
Heckman  (1979). The  impact  of training  on  employment  and  earnings  is
estimated  after  taking  into  account  non-random  selection  into  the  programs.
The  choice  of this  approach  was based  on three  considerations:  the  cross-
sectional  nature  of the  data  set,  the  lack  of information  on occupation  and
earnings  prior  to the  training  course,  and  the  scope  of the  training
information  gathered  through  the  PLSS.
The  next section  of this  paper  reviews  the  available  background
information  on the  Peruvian  training  system. Section  III  describes  the
training  patterns  observed  among  salaried  and self-employed  workers  in  Lima
and  Other  Urban  Areas (OUAS). Section  ,V  presents  an  analysis  of the
determinants  of selection  into  post-school  training,  and  Section  V considers
the  labor  market  outcomes  of  training  for  workers  in the  private  sector  and
for  the  self-employed.- 5  ..
II.  OVERVIEW  OF THE POST-SCHOOL  TRAINING  SYSTEW'
Peruvian  workers  reclive  post-school  training  from  several  sources. Job-
based  training  programs,91  off  or on-the-job,  are  offered  by decentLalized
public  agencies  with financial  and  educational  autonomy. These  agencies,  are
administered  by boards  representing  employers,  workers,  and  the  relevant
ministries  (Mining,  Labor,  Health,  Industry,  Agriculture,  Fisheries).
Training  in  Post-secondary  level  programs  is  provided  by public  and  private
technical  institutes  and  universities,  as  well as  by institutions  managed  by
some  enterpreneurial  associations  (such  as the  Institute  for  Business
Adminiistration,  IPAE)  or  by a groun  of firms. In addition,  there  exist  a
variety  of proprietary  schools  of: ring  a  number  of job-training  programs  to
heterogeneous  client  poputlations.  These  institutions,  which  are  profit-making
operations  or  non-profit  educational  organizations,  operate  outside  the
publicly  coordinated  training  subsector.
1.  Job-Based  Training  Programs
Available  enrollment  data  and  a brief  description  of the  largest
training  agencies  are  indicative  of the  situation  of post-school  training  in
Peru.
"Servicio  Nacional  de  Aprendizaje  y Trabajo  Industrial"  (SENATI)  is
the  largest  training  institution  in  Peru. It  w&a  established  in  1963  as a
decentralized  agency  of the  Ministry  of  Industry  to train  and  upgrade  manpower
for  the  manufacturing  sector. Until  1981  SENATI  was financed  by a 1.5Z  tax  on
the  payroll  of all  industrial  enterprises  with 15  or  more  workers. In 1981
the  tax  base  was expanded  to all  industrial  enterprises  with  5 or  more
workers,  and  all  firms  in  other  sectors  dealing  with  the  installation,
maintenance  or repair  of  machinery  and  equipment. SENATI  claims  to  have
provided  training  courses  to  over  200,000  workers  between  1963  and  1976
(UNESCO,  1978). Accounting  for  the  fact  that  some  workers  participate  in  more
than  one  training  course,  the  World  Bank (April  1982)  estimates  that  about
100,000  workers  have  received  training  at SENATI  through  1980.  The  main
programs  offered  are  as follows:
(i)  Apprenticeship:  this  program  starts  with three  cycles  of 5.5
months  each  in  a training  center,  and  one  cycle  of the  same  length  in  the  firm
sponsoring  the  trainee. The  Areas  offered  are  carpentry,  leather  goods
manufacturing,  electricity  mechanics,  and  auto-mechanics.  The  entrance
requirements  are  sponsorship  by an enterprise,  three  years  of secondary
school,  age  between  14  and  20  years,  and  a passing  of a general  knowledge
8/  Note  that  this  review  does  not  present  a comprehensive  survey  of
job-training  programs  in  Peru  because  no data  are  available  on overall
enrollments  and  expenditures  on these  programs. Moreover,  the  information  on
resources  and  performance  of  the  Peruvian  training  institutions  and  their
trends  overtime  is  extremely  limited.
9/  Defined  here  as off  or on-the-job  training  received  in training
centers,  in  plant,  or in  the  military.- 6 -
test.  However,  according  to the  World  Bank (April,  1982)  all  accepted
applicants  to this  program  have  completed  secondary  schooling.  Upon
completion  of the  program,  the  enterprise  has  no obligation  to  hire the
graduates.  rld  Bank  reports  estimate  that  about  12,000  youths  participated
in the  program  between  1963  and  1980.
(ii) In-service  upgrading: this  program  offers  short  intensive  courses
(from  60  to 90  hours)  to  employed  skilled  workers  in large  firms. The  areas
covered  by this  program  are  machine  shop  mechanics,  textiles,  and  drafting  and
design. About  35,000  workers  participated  in  this  program  between  1963  and
1980.
(iii)  In-house  trainings this  program  consists  of short  courses  at the
supervisory  and  skilled  worker  levels,  tailored  to enterprise  needs. The
subjects  are  work  methods,  industrial  security,  and  safety. About  33,500
workers  participated  in this  program  up to 1980.
(iv) Support  to small  and  medium  size  industries:  through  1980,  some
2,500  workers  had  participated  in the  short  courses  offered  by this  program  in
the  areas  of production  and sales,  financial  resources,  cost  control,  quality
control,  marketing,  and  financial  administration.
(v)  Mobile  units: SENATI  has seven  mobile  units  with  machinery,  tools,
classroom  and  teaching  materials. The  units  provide  courses  in several  cities
in auto-mechanics,  metal  construction  and  machine  maintenance,  machine  shop,
and  electricity.  Since  the  mobile  units  have  been  in operation  about  6,000
workers  have  participated  in  these  courses.
(vi) Instructor  training  and  upgrading: This  program  provides  16-month
courses  for  training  instructors  in  machine  shop/fitting,  metal  construction,
electricity/industrial  electronics,  drafting  and  design,  and  auto-mechanics.
Between  1975  and  1981,  1,630  individuals  were  enrolled.
(vii)  Distance-learning  programs:  This  program  started  in 1978  through
correspondence  courses. It intended  to raise  the  education  standards  of
prospective  trainees  with less  than  complete  secondary  schooling. Thus  far,
only  740  individuals  have  participated  in the  program.
There  has  been  little  evaluation  of SENATI's  performance.  According
to the  World  Bank (Report  3897-PE),  low  efficiency  at a  high  cost  seems
prevalent  in  all  SENATI's  programs. This  appears  to  be the  result  of lengthy
training  programs,  ur.-ecessary  entrance  tests,  high  drop-out  rates,  and  large
administrative  structures.  Thus,  in  1980,  the  drop-out  rates  were  32 percent,
37  percent  and  52 percent  in the  apprenticeship,  support  to industries,  and
mobile  units  programs,  respectively.  The  apprenticeship  program  represented
only  9.4  percent  of SENATI's  enrollment  while  absorbing  58 percent  of its
recurrent  expenditures.  Its  output  was  estimated  at less  than  500  trainees
per  year,  and  expenditures  on the  administrative  (non-teaching)  staff  reached
60  percent  of the  total  salary  bill  of the  institution.
"Servicio  Nacional  de  Capacitacion  para la  Industria  de la
Construccion"  (SENCICO),  the  institution  responsible  for  training  in  the-7-
conistruction  sector,  was created  in  1977  as a decentralized  agency  of the
Ministry  of Housing. It is  financed  by a 0.52  payroll  tax  on construction
sector  enterprises,  and  trained  about  24,000  workers  between  1977  and  1980.
SENCICO  provides  training  courses  of 100  to  230  hi-urs  at four  levels: non-
skilled  (peones),  semi-skilled  (oficiales),  skilled  (operarios),  and  site
supervisors  (maestros  de  obra). The  courses  offered  ares masonry,  carpentry,
metal  structures,  electrical  installations,  and sanitary  installations.  World
Bank  estimates  (April,  1982)  report  that  about  23,600  construction  workers
were trained  by SENCICO  between  1977  and  1980.
Available  information  on SENCICO's  performance  show  high  drop-out
rates  and  an  excessively  large  administrative  structure.  Thus,  in 1981  the
overall  drop-out  rate  was 42  percent. This  wastage  seems  mostly  due  to  many
workers  that  change  work sites  during  their  training  courses. SENCICO's
excessive  staff  is reflected  by its  expenditures  on administrative  staff
salaries,  which  represented  some  86  percent  of its  total  wage  bill (Ibid.).
CENFOTUR  "(Centro  Nacional  de  Formacion  en Turismo)"  providing
training  for  the  tourism  sector,  was established  in  1977  as  a decentralized
agency  of the  Ministry  of Industry,  partly  financed  by a special  tax  charge  on
hotel  and  restaurant  bills. It  appears  to  be the  only  public  training  agency
that  obtains  about  30Z  of its  revenues  from  fees  and  direct  charges  to
trainees. It offers  several  6-semester  courses  to individuals  with 8  or 9
years  of schooling,  and  5-semester  courses  to individuals  who have  completed
secondary  schooling. The  main  hotel  trades  covered  by CENFOTUR  are:
reception,  restaurant,  kitchen/bar,  storage,  costs  and  sales,  and  hotel
security. The  main  tourism  trades  include: tourist  guide,  high  mountains
guide,  excursion  planning,  sales  and  distribution,  promotion,  and  marketing.
Available  data  on  CENFOTUR  operations  indicate  that  by 1980  its  output  was
about  1,500  participants  per  year (World  Bank,  April,  1982).
CEFOCAP,  "(Centro  de  Formacion  y  Capacitacion  de Personal)"  is  an
agency  created  in  1977  under  the  auspices  and  financial  support  of the
Ministry  of  Mining. It is linked  to  Electro-Peru,  a state  enterprise  and  to
Electro-Lima,  a  private  business. Its  training  activities  include  skilled
workers,  plant  supervisors,  technical,  administrative,  and  managerial  staff  of
the  above  mentioned  enterprises.  CEFOCAP  also  operates  a  mining  school  which
offers  short  upgrading  courses  (1  to 2  weeks),  and  a 2-year  program  for
workers  with complete  secondary  schooling  in the  areas  of exploration,
exploitation,  topography,  and  mineral  concentration.  Available  figures
indicate  that  about  8,000  individuals  participated  in its  courses  in  1977.
In addition  to these  sectoral  training  agencies,  there  are  several
somewhat  smaller  job-based  training  programs  sponsored  by the  government.  In
1972  a handicrafts  enterprise  was created  under  the  supervision  of the
Ministry  of Industry  to provide  handicrafts  training  and  marketing  services  to
ceramics,  textiles  and  wool  handicrafts  workers. The  latest  available
estimates  show  this  program  had  about  550  participants  in its  courses  and
seminars  in 1977.  In  1981  it  was  converted  into  a self-financed  commercial
enterprise.  Data  on the  current  size  of its  operations  are  not  available.-8-
The  Ministry  of  Labor  operates  5 training  centers  and  a  mobile  unit.
They  offer  4 to 9-month  courses  in  masonry,  carpentry,  electricity,  metal
structures,  welding,  auto-mechanics,  maintenance  mechanics,  and  technical
drawing. Entrants  to  these  centers  must  have  more  than  5  years  of schooling.
They  are  reported  to  have  about  400  participants  per  year.
The  Ministry  of Fisheries  has  operated  a  Training  Office  since  1971
to train  fishermen  and  fish  processing  plant  personnel. It  provides  courses
of 50 to  100  hours  in  the  areas  of fish  capture,  fish  processing,  continental
water  fishing,  and  electromechanics.  Estimates  indicate  about  3,000
participants  per  year in  its  courses  (UNESCO,  1978).
Finally,  the  military  also  offers  training  for  skills  of use  in  the
civilian  sector  such  as mechanics,  electricity,  welding,  plumbing,  etc. This
training  is  provided  to enlisted  men during  their  military  service  period.
In 1983,  the  World  Bank  prepared  an investment  project  in  Peru's
non-formal  vocational  training  system  (Report  4678-PE). Although  the  Bank  did
not  carry  out  an empirical  evaluation  of the  sector,  it identified  se  9'ai
sectoral  issues: lack  of coordination  between  sectoral  training  agenr-
weakness  in investment  planning;  limited  output  of  training  activitif  .
relation  to training  needs;  and  low  efficiency  of training  programs  (World
Bank,  LAC  Projects,  April  1983).
2.  Post-secondary  Training  Programs
Besides  the  job-hased  training  programs  offered  by the  sectoral  and
public  training  agencies,  Peruvian  workers  can  obtain  occupational  training  in
tejchnical  institutesioi.  These  institutes  offer  training  courses  ranging  from
six  months  to  one  and  a  half  years  to individuals  with secondary  schooling.
In general,  they  train  people  for  middle-level  jobs  in a  wide range  of
subjects: electronics,  computing,  accounting,  bookkeeping,  secretarial,
public  relations,  marketing,  business  administration  and  the  like. In
addition,  several  universitiesll/  provide  training  outside  their  regular
curricula. They  offer  courses  and  workshops  from  40  hours  to 1,000  hours  to
upgrade  employed  middle-level  management  personnel  and  university  graduates.
These  continuing  education  programs  cover  the  same  subjects  as universities'
regular  curricula. For  example,  they  offer  upgrading  courses  for  primary  and
secondary  teachers,  micro-computing,  library  science,  etc.
10/  They  are  called  "Institutob  Superiores  Tecnologicos".
il/  Including  public  and  private  universities.-9-
3.  Proprietary  TraininR  Schools
An additional  training  alternative  available  to  Peruvian  workers  is
to enroll  in  an "academe" 12 1  or  proprietary  school. Although  they  operate
with  a  wide  variety  of institutional  arrangements,  teach  a  variety  of trades,
and  attract  different  client  populations,  they  have  several  common  features.
Unlike  formal  schools,  they  have  flexible  starting  schedules,  initiating
classes  several  times  a  year,  and  offer  classes  at different  times  of the  day.
Prices  and  course  lengths  vary greatly. Since  the  large  majority  of these
agencies  are  not cLordinated  or supervised  by the  government,  the  number  of
private  training  agencies  operating  in  Peru  is  unknown. According  to
unofficial  estimates  of the  Ministry  of Education  there  were  more than  2,000
such  academes  in the  country  in  1986. They  offer  short,  classroom  type
training  courses  (ranging  from  one  week to  six  months)  in  a set  of trades  and
occupations  which  require  low  capital  investments  and  have  a low  operating
cost,  for  the  most  part  due  to inexpensive  instructors.  The  most common
courses  orfered  cover  clerical  skills,  some  health-related  skills,
cosmetology,  hairdressing,  interior  design,  tailoring,  cooking,  and  languages.
They  do not  appear  to screen  entrants  by schooling  certificates,  and  advertise
the  possibility  of training  while  working  part-time.
12/  In Peru  these  schools  are  called  "academias".- 10  -
III.  OVERALL  PATTERNS  OF POST-SCHOOL  TRAINING
This  section  examines  thq  PLSS  data  on  the  participation  of  male
workers  in job-training  programsl3'.  The  purpose  of this  section  is to
characterize  the  recipients  of  post-scheol  training  in  Peru  by sector  of
employment  and  training  status,  and  to review  the  longest  training  experience
of  wage  and  self-employed  workers.
1.  The  recipients  of post-school  training  in  Peru
Table  1  compares  mean individual  characteristics,  employment
conditions,  enterprise  characteristics,  labor  supply  and  earnings  of  workers
with  and  without  training  in the  wage and  nonwage  sectors.
The  schooling  information  is  presented  by the  distribution  of
educational  attainment  and  the  two  proxies  of school  quality  used in this
paper: public  versus  private  schooling  attendance,  and  whether  the  last
primary  school  attended  provided  free  meals. Food  at school  was selected
among  other  proxies  because  in  the  Peruvian  context  it  may capture  not  only
physical  reso-irces  available  in a school,  but  also  its  degree  of  organization.
In  other  words,  a school  that  has  and  manages  a free  meal  programs  for  its
students  is likely  to  be a school  with sufficient  physical  facilities  and  good
management,  and  hence  be a better  school. The  family  background  variables
presented  here,  are  meant  to capture  socioeconomic  conditions  and  the  cultural
factors  that  possibly  affected  not  only  the  school  attainment  of the  workers,
but  also  their  training  preferences.
13/  See  variable  definitions  in  Annex  A, Table  A-1.- 11  -
Table  1
Distribution  of  the  Sample  by Sector  of  Employment  and  Training  Status
_WaRe  Workers  Self-employed
Traininga  /  Training4  /
Characteristics  With  Without  With  Without
No.  of  Observations  294  965  159  766
Lima  206  540  91  349
Other  Urban  Areas (OUAs)  88  425  68  417
Age  31.2*  34.1  31.8*  40.6
(8.8)  (12.9)  (9.6)  (12.3)
Schooling
Years  of schooling  10.2*  7.9  10.3*  7.3
(2.8)  (3.6)  (3.0)  (3.7)
Primary  (0-5  yrs)  0.07*  0.33  0.08*  0.43
Some  secondary  (6-9  yrs)  0.16*  0.25  0.21  0.20
Secondary  (10  yrs)  0.44*  0.25  0.30  0.21
Some  higher  (11-13  yrs)  0.18*  0.06  0.25*  0.07
Higher  (14  &  +  yrs)  0.13  0.10  0.14*  0.07
School  last  attended
was  public  0.78*  0.87  0.80*  0.88
Free  meals  last
primary  school  0.39  0.29  0.39  0.30
Background
Father's  years
of  schooling  6.3  4.8  5.6  4.2
Mother's  years
of schooling  4.1  3.2  3.7  2.7
Father's  job  farmer  0.19*  0.37  0.26*  0.42
Married  or as if  0.60  0.58  0.66*  0.77
Ever  migrated  0.68  0.68  0.67  0.76
Main Occupation
Potential  work
experience  (years)  14.7*  19.8  15.2*  27.0
(9.5)  (14.0)  (9.9)  (14.0)
Job  specific
experience  (years)b/  6.1*  8.3  7.0*  11.4
(6.1)  (9.0)  (7.0)  (11.0)
Monthly  earnings  1,387  1,146  1,222  1,187
(intis  June  1985)  (1,238)  (1,437)  (1,356)  (1,369)- 12 -
Real  hourly  wage rate  7.09*  5.68  7.0*  6.0
(intis  June  1985)  (6.3)  (7.0)  (10.2)  (6.5)
Usual  weekly  hours  worked  47.4  49.3  48.4  50.6
(14.0)  (15.7)  (21.0)  (21.1)
Months  worked
last  12  months  9.7  9.4  9.0*  10.3
(3.8)  (3.9)  (4.3)  (3.2)
Union  in the  firm  0.32  0.28
Has  social  security  0.62  0.51
Firm  size:
1 - 20 workers  0.43*  0.55
21 - 200  workers  0.28  0.23
201  +  workers  and
State  enterprises  0.26*  0.19
Enterprise  total  capital  28,3708  27,282
(Intis  June 1986)  (120,297)  (172,936)
Mobile  enterprise  0.49  0.50
Hired  labor  0.35  0.25
Family  labor  0.38  0.40
Note:  a/ t-tests  used  to estimate  differences  between  workers  with and
without  training  in  each  sector.
*  Differences  among  means  are  statistically  significant  at 10 percent
level  or  better.
b/ This  variable  and  the  others  below  refer  to the  main  occupation
during  the  7  days  prior  to the  interview.
Standard  deviations  in  parentheses.
Training  is  widespread  among  male  workers  in urban  areas. As
expected,  more  wage  workers  receive  training  compared  to the  self-employed.
In  Lima,  28 percent  of the  wage  workers  and  17  percent  of self-employed
workers  report  post-school  training. In OUAs,  21 percent  of  wage  workers  and
14  percent  of self-employed  workers  report  training. Individuals  who  pursue
training  are  significantly  younger  than  those  who do  not, regardless  of sector
of  employment.  Hales  with  job-training  have significantly  more formal
schooling  than  those  with  no training. The  figures  indicate  that  post-school
training  is  mostly  pursued  by individuals  with  secordary  schooling,  followed
by those  with some  post-secondary  education. This  pattern  suggests  the
existence  of a gap  between  the  skills  imparted  by the  secondary  school  system
relative  to  the skills  demanded  in  the  labor  market,  where  training  is
perceived  as a "complement"  to formal  education. In  addition,  this  pattern- 13 -
indicates  that  workers  with less  than  secondary  education,  who constitute  over
50  percent  of the  urban  labor  force  in  Peru,  do not  receive  job-skills  from
the  post-school  training  system. A comparison  between  wage  and  self-employed
workers  (with  and  without  training)  reveals  that  both  groups  of  workers
exhibit  similar  profiles  of educational  attainment,  and  of tenure  on the
current  jobl4/.
Regarding  socio,economic  background,  no significant  differences  were
found  between  parental  schooling  of individuals  with and  without  job-training.
Nevertheless,  traineet  seem  to  come  from  urban  backgrounds  rather  than  from
farming  environments.
As expected,  an overall  comparison  of  hourly  wage rates  shows  that
workers  with job-training  command  significantly  higher  wages  in  the  two
sectors. Table  1 also  shows  similar  average  wage rates  between  trained  men in
the  wage and  nonwage  sectors.
Turning  to  employment  conditions  in the  wage sector,  it  appears  that
trained  workers  hold "better  jobs",  even  though  the  mean  values  for  the
subsamples  are  not statistically  different. Trainees  work in larger
enterprises,  have  a  union  in the  firm,  and  enjoy  greater  access  to social
security  benefits. In  general,  utilizing  one  classification  criterion  used  in
Peru,  institutionally  trained  workers  are  found  mainly  in  the  so-called
"formal  sector"i5/.  Contrary  to  expectations,  given  the  content  of the  most
important  training  programs  described  in  Section  II,  where  most  programs
addressed  improved  "production"  related  skills,  no clear  patterns  emerge  from
current  occupation  or industry  of employment  of  wage  workers  (see  Annex  B,
Table  B-1).  In fact,  higher  proportions  of "professionals"  and "clerical
workersn  are  found  among  the  trainees,  while  there  are  surprisingly  lower
proportions  of trained  individuals  in "production"-related  occupations  in  the
manufacturing,  construction  and  transport  sectors. In industry  of employment
there  are slightly  higher  proportions  of trained  workers  than  untrained  in  the
manufacturing,  mining  and  financial  services  sectors. These  findings  suggest
that  either  the  training  efforts  in the  productive  sectors  (e.g.  SENATI  in
manufacturing,  SENCICO  in construction,  CEFOCAP  in  mining),  are  restricted  to
14/  These  results  differ  from  earlier  characterizations  of the  urban
nonwage  sector  in  Peru. Estimates  for  1970  using  a definition  of  non-farm
self-employment  compatible  to  the  PLSS  survey,  indicate  that  workers  in  the
sector  had on  average  4.4  years  of schooling,  compared  to 7 years  among
workers  employed  in  the  formal  sector  (W'ebb,  1975). Table  2 also  shows  that
the  mean  years  of tenure  on  the  current  job  among  the  self-employed  is similar
to that  of the  wage  workers,  and  on  average  about  seven  years. These  results
do not  show  the  high  employment  instability,  low  attachment  to one  firm,  low
earnings,  characteristics  of the  urban  self-employed  sector  in the  early  1970s
(Webb,  1975).  In general,  it  appears  that  the  self-employed  sector  has
undergone  substantive  changes  bewteen  1970  and  1985.
15/  As defined  by firm  size,  legal  status  benefits,  occupational  status,
and  income  level  criteria. For  a review  of the  discussion  on the  formal
versus  informal  sector  classifications  in  Peru,  see  R. Suarez,  April  1987.- 14 -
a  very small  proportion  of the  salaried  workers  in  the  private  sector,  or that
the  individuals  are  not  using  the  training  received  in their  current  jobs.  If
the  latter  is  the  case,  then  the  training  received  might  have  been  used  as a
means  to  move  away  from  productive  to service  occupations.  Note  that  this
apparent  lack  of  matching  between  training  and  current  job  might  be also  due
to the  fact  that  this  study  covers  a  ten-year  interval,  rather  than  current
job-training.
With regard  to the  self-employed,  note  that  the  estimates  of  monthly
income  and  hourly  wage rate  q  presented  here  are  based  on the  responses  to  a
"summary  income'  questionl 6 where  it is  uncertain  whether  returns  to  other
household  members'  labor  and  non-labor  inputs  were excluded. Hence,  when
examining  reported  income  from  the  enterprise  and  the  calculated  hourly  wage
rate  for  the self-employed,  it is  necessary  to  keep in  mind  that  it is  not
clear  whether  these  variables  are  in  fact  comparable  to  those  of salaried
workers. With respect  to  characteristics  of the  enterprise,  "total  capital"
(all  physical  assets  and inventory)  seems  to  be the  only  variable
significantly  different  between  self-employed  with and  without  job-training.
Besides  assets,  both  groups  appear  to operate  similar  businesses.  They  run  a
street  business,  use family  labor,  and  make  similar  use  of  hired  labor. As
expected,  (see  Annex  B, Table  B-2)  most  of the  self-employed  were found  in
retail  trade  (38  percent). About  47  percent  were engaged  in  production-
related  occupations,  mainly  in the  manufacturing,  transportation  and
construction  sectors. Trainees  were  mostly  found  in liberal  professions  in
the  finance  sector,  and  in  production  related  occupations  in the  manufacturing
and  transport  sectors.
2.  Participation  by Type  of  Training  Institution
An examination  in detail  of trainees  in the  wage and  nonwag  sectors
will  provide  a  more  comprehensive  picture  of the  training  reported. The
"time"  of the  longest  training  event  in  the  life  cycle  of  urban  males,  takes
place  not  during  or immediately  after  schooling,  but  several  years  after
entering  the  labor  force. In fact,  less  than  2  percent  of  all  male trainees
received  training  while  at school,  and  less  than  4  percent  immediately  after.
This  result  suggests  that  in the  case  of Peru,  the  longest  training  spell--
supposedly  the  most significant--is  received  by workers  already  employed,
rather  than  by  new entrants  in  the  labor  force.
Table  2  presents  a summary  of the  basic  features  of the  training
event  recorded  by the  PLSS,  grouped  by type  of training  institution.  The
criteria  for  grouping  agencies  are  based  on the  information  on the  Peruvian
training  system  overviewed  in  Section  II.  Recall  that  job-based  programs
(JBP)  were defined  as those  courses  received  on-the-job  or  off-the-job  in
occupational  training  agencies,  and  in  the  military. Post-secondary  training
programs  (PST)  include  the  courses  provided  by technical  institutes  and
universities.  Finally,  "academes"  (ACT)  (proprietary  schools)  are  kept
separate  because  of the  large  number  of  wage and  self-employed  workers  who
16/  The  specific  question  reads: How  much  money  did  you  make from  this
activity?- 1S  -
received  training  in  them. The  remaining  category,  *other",  includes
correspondence  courses  as  well  as all  other  job-training  received  from
unidentified  sources. Table  3  also  displays  some  key  characteristics  of the
trainees  in  regard  to  the  choice  of provider.- 16 -
Table  2
Wage  and  Self-employed  Workers
Data  on Longest  Course  and  Trainees  by Type  of Institutions
Type  of Training Institution
Post-sec.
Characteristics  Job  Based  Institute  Academes  Other
(JBP)  (PST)  (ACT)
Number  of observations
Wage  workers  136  58  72  28
Self-employed  65  21  47  26
Mean  age  when trained
Wage  workers  27.1  26.8  24.0  28.8
Self-employed  27.2  21.9  25.3  27.1
Mean  years  of schooling  when  trained
Wage  workers  9.7  11.5  9.8  10.0
Self-employed  9.4  11.2  10.2  10.5
Mean  years  ago  training  was undertaken
Wage  workers  4.7  4.5  5.0  4.5
,elf-employed  5.9  5.8  5.5  6.5
Years  between  labor  force  entry  and  training
Wage  workers  11.1  9.0  7.9  12.3
Self-employed  11.4  4.3  8.7  10.2
Percentage  <  3 years  in  the  labor  force  when  trained
Wage  workers  0.14  0.22  0.28  0.35
Self-employed  0.21  0.62  0.32  0.42
Percentage  same  job  as  when trained
Wage  workers  0.50  0.43  0.39  0.42
Self-employed  0.46  0.38  0.49  0.38
Percentage  received  training  diplonia
Wage  workers  0.63  0.65  0.57  0.71
Self-employed  0.63  0.66  0.65  0.61
Mean  hours  of training
Wage  workers  505  623  368  273
Self-employed  440  1,104  399  436
In general,  the  figures  of  Table  2 show  similar  profiles  between
trainees  in  the  wage  and  nonwage  sectors. Job-based  programs  (JBP)  and
proprietary  institutions  (ACT)  have  the  highest  demand  for  job-training  among
male  urban  workers. The  high  proportion  of  male  workers  who receive  job-
training  in  these  "academes"  is  an unexpected  finding. In developing- 17 -
countries,  the  role  of this  type  of for-profit  proprietary  school  has  been
usually  discounted  as  marginal  because  of low  effectiveness  by education
authorities  and  planners  (Dougherty,  1986). However,  and  possibly  because  of
their  low  opportunity  cost,  they  appear  to  be in  high  demand. They  may
provide  certain  "job-skills"  that  are  not  available  through  the  usually  free,
officially  sponsored  schemes,  or  have  client  populations  that  have  no access
to  the  official  training  system. It  may be that  Peruvian  ACTs  have close
links  to job-placement  services,  typical  of this  type  of training  institution
in  developed  countries  (Freeman,  1974). They  may offer  part-time  or night
courses,  or  have  other  arrangements  that  keep students  out  of the  labor  market
only  for  a short  period  of time,  or  not  at all. Table  3  shows  that  academes
provide  comparatively  shorter  courses.
On average,  the  long.st  training  course  received  was about  5  years
ago,  when  most  participants  were in their  mid-twenties,  and  had about  10 years
of  work experience.  Secondary  schooling  is the  lowest  level  of formal
schooling  of  participants  in  all  types  of job-training  programs  in  Peru.  This
holds  true  even  for  trainees  in  JBP,  which  are  supposed  to  provide  mainly
production-related  skills. Not  surprisingly--since  the  training  event
reported  is  the longest  course  ever  attended--the  average  length  of the
training  program  !is  quite  substantial,  particularly  in  JBP  and  PST.
Consistent  with the  drop-out  figures  of the  major  training  institutions
(Section  II),  Table  2 shows  that  about  60  percent  of the  trainees  completed
the  course  and  received  a diploma. Finally,  the  table  shows  that  over  40
percent  of the  trainees  have  the  same  job  they  held  when the  training  event
took  place.- 18 -
IV.  DETERMINANTS  OF POST-SCHOOL  TRAINING  PARTICIPATION
This  section  explores  the  factors  that  determine  the  probability
that  wage and  self-employed  workers  will receive  training,  with particular
emphasis  on the  effect  of educational  attainment.  To find  out  whether
schooling  and  training  investments  are  complements  or substitutes  would
provide  an essential  piece  of information  to policymakers.  In  addition,
information  on the  determinants  of individual  participation  decisions  provide
policymakers  with  useful  data  to  appraise  the  potential  effects  of their
decisions. Finally,  self-selection  into  training  courses  is a  critical
methodological  issue  for  the  evaluation  of the  impacts  of training  programs.
First,  because  the  participation  decision  is  endogenous,  and  second,  because
training  decisions  depend  on  past labor  market  outcomes.  Hence,  there  is a
correlation  between  the  variables  in  the  training,  earnings  and  employment
equations  before  and  after  training.
In general,  the  :hoice  of training  depends  on a comparison  of the
costs  with the  present  va.'ue  of  expected  future  earnings  associated  with each
alternative.  Since  expected  earnings  vary  across  individuals  according  to
Socioeconomic  characteristics,  family  background  and  ability,  a set  of
regressors  was included  (Z)  which  are  likely  to affect  the  decision  to train.
As for  the  self-employed,  one  would  expect  they  have fewer  incentives  to train
than  do  wage  workers  in the  private  sector. First,  they  must pay  the  full
cost  of training. Second,  they  are  likely  to  benefit  more from  general
training,  since  their  productivity  depends  not  only  on productive  skills  but
on their  supervisory  and  organizational  skills  as  well (Fredland  and  Little,
1981).
In a binary  choiceIZ/  model  the  training  choice  is defined  as:
Pj,  f(Vj+  vj)
and  the  probability  of  not  choosing  training  is:
PO=  f(  VO  + v)
In this  case,
V1 =  Z71 and  VO - Z7Y 0
where  Z represents  a vector  of observed  characteristics  likely  to
a.fect  the  choice  of training. Each  characteristic  affects  each  alternative
differently,  as reflected  by the  choice  specific  coefficients  71 and 7Y and  v,
and  vo are  randomly  distributed  error  terms. The  individual  will choose
training  if:
P1 > PO  or equivalently  if:
17/  Where  the  dummy  variable  OP equal  to 1 if training  was  undertaken
between  1975  and  the  date  of the  survey.- 19  -
V1 - Vo  >  Vo  - V1
This  framework  of analysis  will  be applied  first  to the  probability
of training  participation,  and  second  to  the  probability  of receiving  training
from  different  types  of institution.
Previous  stu,dies  (Ashenfelter,  1978,  Ashenfelter  and  Card,  1985)
have  shown  that  participation  in  training  programs  depends  strongly  on labor
market  performance  in  the  period  prior  to  the  training  event. Individuals
whose  earnings  have  fallen  or  were abnormally  low  before  training  are  more
likely  to enroll  in  training  programs. Unfortunately,  past  earnings  and  a
complete  occupational  history  are  not reported  in  the  data. Nevertheless,  by
assuming  no breaks  in  either  schooling  or labor  market  participation,
retrospective  information  was  constructed  on labor  market  experience,
schooling  and  migration  of the  workers  at the  time  of the  choice  and  ten  years
ago.  The  date  of the  longest  training  event  was  known  for  those  who attended
a course. Therefore,  to find  out  what  their  schooling  and  labor  market
experience  were at the  time  of the  decision  was straightforward  for  this
subsample.  This  information  was  not  available  for  the  non-participant  group,
since  it  was not  known  when they  decided  not  to train. For  these  cases,  the
approach  of Jimenez  and  Kugler  (1987)  in  Colombia  was  used.  That  is,  an
assumption  was made  that  the  date  of  the  decision  not  to train  was  when
trained  workers  of the  same  age  received  the  longest  course. The  procedure  is
as follows. First,  estimates  were  made  of the  mean  age  at  which  each  age
cohort  received  training. For  example,  the  cohort  of trainees  whose  age  is  20
years  obtained  training  when  on average  they  were 17.2  years  old.  Second,
each  of these  age-specific  means  was  used  to impute  the  age  at  which  the  non-
trained  decided  not  to train. In the  example,  those  non-trained  whose  current
age  was 20  years,  would  have  made that  choice  when  they  were 17.2  years  old.
Once  an age  of training  choice  was imputed  for  non-participants,  their  labor
market  experience,  migration,  and  schooling  at  the  time  was  calculated.181
The  set  of explanatory  variables  used  in the  model  includes
estimated  formal  schooling  indicators,  labor  market  experience  and  migration
prior  to the  training  event,  and  family  background.  Schooling  effects  are
captured  by five  dummy  variables  for  the  last  level  of formal  schooling
completed  (see  Annex  A, Table  A-1, for  definitions  of the  variables  used in
the  analysis). These  variables  are  expected  to capture  changes  in the
probability  of training  associated  with different  levels  of schooling.  Two
proxies  for  school  quality  were  also  included. One  of them  indicates  whether
the  last  school  attended  was public  or private,  and  the  other  indicates
whether  the  individual  received  free  meals  at the  last  primary  school
attended.
18/  The  age  at  which  formal  schooling  was completed  for  those  who  have
at least  high  school  was used  to  test  the  sensitivity  of the  estimates  to this
assumption,  using  the  mean  for  the  rest. The  results  obtained  with this
alternative  assumption  were similar  to  those  of the  participation  model
estimated  here.- 20 -
Workers  in the  PLSS  sample  participated  in training  long  after  they
entered  the  labor  market,  and  on average,  over  5  years  before  the  date  of the
survey. Therefore,  it  was apropriate  to  consider  labor  market  factors  that
made this  alternative  an  optimal  choice  to  maximize  earnings  potential  at the
time  the  decision  was  made.  The  following  proxies  included  in the  model  are
expected  to  capture  individual's  labor  market  performance  at that  time.
First,  three  dummy  variables  indicating  the  occupational  status  of each
individual  ten  years  ago: self-employed,  wage  workers,  still  in school.
Second,  a dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  individual  was  a new  entrant
to the  labor  force  at the  time  of training. Finally,  the  total  number  of
years  of potential  work  experience  before  training.
Socieconomic  background  is  proxied  by father's  years  of schooling,
by a dummy  variable  equal  to 1 if  the  father's  occupation  most  of his  life  was
farming,  and  by dummies  for  non-city  place  of birth,  and  by  migration  at the
time  of training. These  variables  are  expected  to capture  the  impact  of
socioeconomic  and  family  environment  on individual  preferences  for  job-
training. The  inclusion  of the  vector  of  family  background  variables  in the
decision  to  train,  miay  bias  the  true  relationship  between  schooling  and
training  because  these  variables  also  determine  school  attainment.  However,  a
comparison  of the  results  of the  model  with  alternative  specifications  without
the  vector  of background  variables  did  not  reveal  such  a bias.
1.  Wage  Workers
Table  3 presents  the  results  of the  participation  model. The  first
column  shows  the  probit  coefficients.  In  order  to be  able  to interpret  the
coefficients  as the  change  in the  probability  of receiving  training  associated
with a  unit  of change  in the  explanatory  variable,  the  second  column  shows  the
estimated  marginal  effects  of the  independent  variables  on  the likelihood  of
receiving  training. Given  the  non-linearity  of the  probit  model,  these
marginal  effects  are  not  constant. Here,  they  were evaluated  at the  mean
probability  in the  sample.192
19/  This  marginal  effect  is given  by  9 p  (Xi),  where  p  is the  probit
coefficient  on a  particular  variable,  and  4 is  the  cumulative  density  function
of the  standarized  normal  for  the  average  individual  in the  sample.- 21 -
Table  3
Wage  Workers: Selection  into  Training
Independent
variables  Probit  coeff.  Marginal  effect!'
Constant  -1.460*  -0.545*
10.22]
New  entrant  in  LF  -0.395*  -O.153*
_0.153*
at the  time  [0.111
Potential  experience  0.027*  0.010*
at the  time (years)  (0.006]
Salaried  worker  -0.487*  -0.189*
10 years  ago  [0.11]
Student  10  years  ago  -0.0221  -0.008
(0.11]
Some  secondary  schooling  0.662*  0.257
(6-9  years)_/  (0.151
Secondary  schooling  1.340*  0.520*
completed  (10  years)  (0.15]
some  post-secondary  1.610*  0.625*
schooling  (11-13  years)  [0.16]
Post-sec.  schooling  1.119*  0.434*
complete  (14+  years)  [0.181
Last  school  attended  -0.180  -0.069
was  public  (0.11]
Received  free  meals  0.295*  0.114*
last  primary  school  schooling  [0.091
Father's  occupatior  -0.346*  -0.134*
farmer  [0.111
Father's  years  of  0.004  0.001
schooling  [0.01]
Born  in  country  side,  0.062  0.024
village  or town  (0.13]- 22 -
Never  migrated  -0.402*  -0.156*
(0.09]
Lima  0.149  0.057
10.09]
-2 log  likelihood  569.71
No.  observations  1,259
Note:  a/  Evaluated  at the  mean  probability  in  the sample.
b/ Excluded  category  is  primary  schooling.
*  Statistically  significant  at the  10  percent  level  or better.
Standard  errors  in  brackets.
Table  3 shows  that  among  wage  workers  the  probability  of receiving
occupational  training  is strongly  determined  by the  level  of school
attainment. Increases  in formal  education  raise  the  training  likelihood.  For
the  average  person  in  the  sample,  those  who  have  completed  secondary  school  or
more  have the  highest  probability  of  enrolling  in  training  courses. These
results  support  the  hypothesis  that  training  is  a 'complement'  to formal
education,  particularly  at the  secondary  and  post-secondary  level. They  also
suggest  that  the "quality,  of the  education  received  matters  for  participation
in training. A possible  interpretation  of these  findings  is that  excess
demand  for  higher  education  is directed  into  training  programs. However,  as
seen  earlier,  workers  do not  undertake  job-training  immediately  after  leaving
school,  but  delay  the  job-training  experience  for  several  years. It is also
possible  that  these  findings  reflect  a gap  between  the  skills  imparted  by the
secondary  school  system  and  the  skills  required  in the  labor  market  for  some
jobs  and  pay  levels. As a third  interpretation,  the  screening  hypothesis
would  argue  that  it is  the  search  for ncertificationn  that  motivates  these
individuals  to seek  job-training.  If the  attainment  of a certificate  were a
criterion  to enter  job-training,  those  who do  not  have  a formal  education
"diploma"  would  have  a significantly  higher  probability  of enrollment  in
training  programs. However,  the  inclusion  of school  diplomas  tn  the
participation  model  does  not lend  support  to this  hypothesis2OP
As seen  in  Table  3,  more  experienced  workers  have  a higher
likelihood  of participation  in  training  programs. This  likelihood  is
significantly  lower  for  new entrants  in  the  labor  force. That is,  workers
with less  than  three  years  of  experience  at the  time,  have a  chance  of
participating  in training  about  15 percentage  points  lower  than  that  of  more
experienced  workers. Those  who  already  had  wage  employment  ten  years  ago  also
consistently,  exhibit  lower  probability  of participation  in training  courses
relative  to those  unemployed,  self-employed  or out  of the  labor  force. The
opportunity  costs  of  job-training  are  likely  to  be highest  for  those  already
in  wage employment.  In addition,  it is  possible  that  these  workers  fail  to
20/  This  was tested  for  secondary-technical,  post-secondary,  and
university  diplomas._ 23 -
report  the  informal  or  non-institutional  training  they  may  have  obtained  in
their  jobs.  Those  who  were students  ten  years  ago  also  exhibit  a lower
probability  of participation  in training. In  general,  these  findings  suggest
that  the  choice  of investment  in  job-training  in Peru  is  largely  a "career
choice'  mgde  by experienced  workers  in order  to improve  opportunities  in the
workplace.
Even  though  most  workers  undertake  training  well into  their  working
lives.  the  impact  of  background  variables  on the  participation  decision  is
strong. In  contrast  with results  for  Colombia  (Jimenez  and  Kugler,  1987),  the
father's  education  has  no significant  impact  on the  decision  to  participate  in
training  programs  among  salaried  males  in  urban  Peru. However,  individuals
whose  fathers  were farmers  most of  their  lives  are  less  likely  to  enter
training  courses. The  other  p-oxies  show  the  relative  disadvantage  of
individuals  of rural  origin  regarding  chances  to train. Finally,  that  there
is  no difference  in the  likelihood  of receiving  training  between  those  who
live  in  Lima  and  in  OUAs.
In  order  to further  explore  the  relationship  between  schooling  and
training,  the  participation  model  is  applied  to the  choice  of different  types
of institutions  those  offering  job-based  programs  (JBP)  or  post-secondary
training  programs  (PST),  and  academes  (ACT). Table  4  summarizes  the  estimated
marginal  effects  of different  levels  of school  attainment  on the  probability
of training  by type  of institution,  evaluated  at  the  mean  probability  of the
sample.
Table  4
Wage  Workers:  Effects  of  Educational  Attairment  on the
Probability  of Training  by Type  of Institution
Post-secondary
Educational  Attainment  Job  Based  Training  Academes
(JBP)  (PST)  (ACT)
Some  secondaryA/  0.095  0.265  0.065
(6-9  years)  (1.52)  (1.57)  (0.91)
Secondary  complete  0.302*  0.529*  0.133*
(10  years)  (5.10)  (3.59)  (1.89)
Some  post-secondary  0.160*  0.754*  1.145*
(11-13  years)  (2.00)  (4.88)  (2.87)
Post-secondary  complete  0.114  0.583*  -0.003
(14+  years)  (1.39)  (4.35)  (0.97)
Notes: a/  Excluded  category  is  primary  schooling.
*  Statistically  significant  at the  5 percent  level  or better.
t  values  in  parentheses.- 24 -
The  table  shows  that  the  strong  complementarity  between  educational
attainment  and  training  found  earlier  applies  to  all  institutions.  In fact,
formal  schooling  is  an important  determinant  of the  probability  of
participating  in  the  programs  offered  by all  providers.  H.o'ever,  some
specific  patterns  appear  by type  of provider. Compared  with the  omitted
group--primary  school  leavers--the  probability  of receiving  training  from  a
JBP  is  highest  for  employees  with  completed  secondary  education,  followed  by
those  with some  post-secondary  schooling.  As expected,  given  the  entry
requirements,  those  with  more than  secondary  education  have the  highest
likelihood  to receive  training  from  a PST. Even  though  formal  schooling  shows
a relatively  lower  impact  on the  probability  of receiving  training  from  ACT,
its  effect  is  still  different  from  zero.
The labor  market  variables,  not shown  in  Table  4  because  they
basically  parallel  findings  reported  in  Table  3,  have  the strongest  effect  on
the  likelihood  to receive  training  from  a  JBP. As expected,  given  that  many
of  these  programs  are  directly  related  to the  employer,  being  a  new  entrant  in
the  labor  force  decreases  the  probability  of receiving  JBP  by 6  percent.
Potential  labor  market  experience  shows  a  negative  effect  on the  probability
of training  in  an  ACT, suggesting  that  new  entrants  to  the  labor  force  are
more likely  to  train  at  academes. The  lack  of job  experience  entry
requirements  for  ACT  programs  may  be part  of its  appeal.
2.  Self-employed  Workers
Table  5 presents  the  results  of estimating  the  participation  model.
As before,  the  marginal  effects  are  evaluated  at the  mean  probability  in  the
sample. The  participation  decision  of the  self-employed  is  presumed  to be
determined  by the  same  earnings  maximization  objective  as the  salaried
workers. In  addition  to  the  regressors  described  earlier,  an  additional  dummy
variable  "enterprise  age'  with the  value  of 1  was included  to  denote  that  the
household  operated  the  business  before  the  particular  individual  began  to  work
in it.  This  variable  may  be expected  to  have  a  negative  effect  on the
probability  of training  for  two  reasons. First,  an  individual  who took  over
an established  family  business  is likely  to  have inherited  customers,
suppliers,  etc.,  thereby  reducing  the  potential  benefits  of training. Second,
the  presence  of accumulated  skills  in  a long  existing  enterprise  may afford
opportunities  for  informal  training  (apprenticeship)  and  this  may act  as a
substitute  for  institutional  training.- 25 -
Table  5
Self-Employed  Workerst Selection  into  Training
Independent
variables  Probit  coeff.  Marginal  effect
Constant  1.232  -0.486
[0.26]
Potential  experience  0.026*  0.010*
[0.002]
Enterprise  age  -0.215*  -0.084*
(0[10]
Student  10 years  ago  0.284*  0.111*
[0.16]
Self-employed  10  0.356*  -0.140*
years  ago  (0.12]
Secondary  schooling  0.638*  0.248*
complete  (10  years)aI  [0.13]
Some  post-secondary  1.091*  0.428*
schooling  (11-13  years)  [0.17]
Post-sec.  schooling  0.620*  0.245*
complete  (14+  years)  [0.20]
Last  school  attended  -0.172  -0.067
was  public  [0.15]
Received  free  meals  0.234*  0.009*
last  primary  school  [0.11]
Father's  years  of  0.007  0.003
schooling  [0.01]
Father's  occupation  -0.021*  -0.086*
farming  [0.12]
Born  in country  side,  -0.175  -0.068
village  or  town  [0.15]
Never  migrated  -0.101  -0.039
[0.11]
Lives  in  Lima  0.095  0.037
[0.11]- 26 -
Log likelihood  -368.84
No.  observations  925
Notes: a/ Excluded  category  is less  than  secondary.
*  Statistically  significant  at the  10 percent  level  or  better.
Standard  errors  in  brackets.
As in the  case  of  wage  workers,  the  figures  of Table  5 suggest  a
strong  complementarity  between  secondary  schooling  and  participation  in
occupational  training. Also,  the  more experienced  self-employed  have  a  higher
likelihood  of training,  and  those  who  were  already  in  non-farm  self-employment
ten  years  ago  are  less  likely  to  have  undertaken  training. As expected,  those
self-employed  who did  not  initiate  the  business--those  who  work in  an existing
family  business--exhibit  a lower  probability  of  participating  in training
courses. Finally,  those  individuals  who  were students  ten  years  ago  appear  to
be more likely  to  enroll  in  training  courses  than  those  already  in the  labor
force.
Given  the  small  number  of observations  by type  of  provider  in the
self-employed  sample,  no estimate  was  made of the  impact  of educational
attainment  on the  probability  of training  by type  of institution.- 27 -
V.  THE ECONOMIC  IMPACT  OF TRAINING
The  objective  of this  section  is to  estimate  the  labor  market
outcomes  of job-training  for  workers  in the  wage and  nonwage  sectors,  testing
the  hypothesis  that  training  increases  workers'  productivity  measured  in  an
actual  increase  in earnings. Also  explored  is  whether  the  effect  of  training
on  wages (if  any)  is due  to  productivity  gains  or to the  presence  of  a
credentialism  effect. In this  analysis  examined  figst  are  workers  in the  wage
sector,  and second,  workers  in the  nonwage  sector- . The  definition  of the
variables  used  in this  analysis  can  be found  in  Annex  A, Table  A-1.
The  results  of this  exercise  have  several  policy  implications.  From
society's  point  of  view,  if  training  enhances  the  productivity  of labor  there
are  net  social  gains. Therefore,  government  support  to job-training  programs
can  be justified. If,  however,  training  is  a screening  device,  then  it does
not  have any  impact  on social  productivity.  While  more productive  individuals
command  higher  salaries,  this  is  a function  of their  innate  ability  rather
than  of training. Moreover,  there  is a  negative  overall  impact  on society
because  social  output  falls  by an amount  equal  to the  direct  and  indirect
costs  of that  training. Given  that  most  training  schemes  in  Peru  are  financed
with public  resources  (payroll  and  sales  taxes),  to assess  the  effect  of
training  is a critical  issue  for  policy-making.  If  no enhancement  in
productivity  is found,  then  investing  in  or subsidizing  these  schemes  can  only
be  wasteful. In that  case,  the  financing  arrangements  of the  training
subsector  established  in  the  early  1970s  should  be  modified.
Since  earnings  are  observed  for  wage  and self-employed  workers,  the
general  form  of the  wage equation  for  individuals  with and  without  training  in
each  sector  can  be expressed  as:
lnWl  Pi  x  + a T  + ul  (1)
lnW 2 =P2  x  + u2
where  Wi denotes  the  wage rate  of individual  'i"  in  each  group,  X
represents  observed  characteristics  that  determine  wage rates,  p  is  a  vector
of parameters,  a  is the  post-training  earnings  coefficient,  and  u is  a
normally  distributed  stochastic  error. The  human  capital  model  of the  wage
21/  Research  on the  labor  market  effects  of training  for  Peruvian  women
found  that  training has  a significant  and  positive  effect  on employment
status. (Arriagada,  1988) To examine  employment  effects  of training  among
males,  a sector  of employment  multinomial  logit  model  was  estimated  on  the
probabilities  of employment  in  the  wage  private  or self-employed  sectors,
relative  to  working  for  the  public  sector,  working  with  no pay,  or  not  working
at all.  The  results  of this  estimation  (not  reported  here)  show  that  job-
training  does  not  have  any  effect  on the  choice  of sector  of employment  among
urban  men in  Peru.  That  is,  receiving  job-training  does  not  increase
individuals'  probability  of obtaining  a job  in  the  private  sector  or  of
becoming  self-employed  in the  nonwage  sector.- 28 -
function  (Becker  1964,  Mincer  1974)  can  be represented  by the  following
functional  form:
lnW - 6  + PS  +  pX  +  iX 2 +  aT +  u  (2)
where  LnW is the  hourly  wage  rate,  S is  years  of schooling,  X is labor  market
experience,  T is  a dummy  variable  equal  to 1 if  the  individual  received
training,  0 otherwise,  and  u is  the  error  term  N(0,1). In  this  simple  model
law  reflects  the  effect  of training  on the  wage rate. Wages  are  increased  by
a constant  amount  after  receiving  training. It is  equally  plausible  that
training  could  enhance  wage  growth,  and  trained  workers  would  exhibit  steeper
age-earnings  profiles  than  those  of  workers  without  training. The  difference
of age-earnings  profiles  is  greater,  the  greater  the  cost  of,  and  retuLns  from
the  investment  in training  (Becker,  1964).
However,  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimates  of (2)  will  be
inconsistent  if  participation  in  post-school  training  is  not random. That  is,
the  observed  choice  is  not exogenous  but  may  be an 'optimal  choice*  of the
earnings  maximizing  individual.  The  workers  who received  training  would  have
had  different  wages  from  those  of the  workers  who did  not train,  even  in the
absence  of post-school  training. Here,  the  problem  of selection  bias  arises
when the  decision  to train  is  not  random  with respect  to the  error  term  of the
wage equation. This  may arise  for  two  reasons. First,  the  unobserved
characteristics  partly  determine  participation  in  job-training,  and  that
choice  truncates  the  error  term  in the  wage  equation. Second,  there  may  be
dependence  between  the  observable  determinants  of the  participation  decision
and  the  error  term  in the  wage equation  (Heckman  and  Robb,  1985).
To  account  for  self-selection  the  Heckman's  two-stage  estimation
method  is  used (Heckman,  1979). In  the  first  stage,  the  probability  of
training  equation  was estimated  as defined  in  Section  lV.  Then,  the
selectivity  factor  lambda  (X,  inverse  of the  Mills  ratio)  is included  as a
regressor  in the  wage equation. With  this  correction,  the  estimates  of the
wage equation  take  into  account  differences  in individual  probabilities  of
undertaking  training.
The  wage functions  for  the  trained  and  untrained  group  becomes:
lnW 1 - pl X +  lv  1 + u  (3)
011
lnW 2 = P2  X +  2v  X2 + u
°2-2
where  °11 is the  standard  deviation  of  ui,  u =  trained,  not trained,  ° iv is
the  covariance  between  ui and  v.  And,
X=i  (Z  .1  )  and  X2 =  i(  tZ  2 Y
F(Z7 1 1-F(Z7  )
where  0  is  the  cumulative  distribution  function,  and  F is  the  normal
density  function. With  this  procedure  the  coefficier.t  of the  training- 29 -
variable  will show  the  true  effect  of training  on  wage rates  by  holding  the
probability  of  participation  in  training  constant.
The  wage equation  follows  the  human  capital  literature  where
schooling,  participation  in job-training  programs  and  work experience  are
expected  to  have  a  positive  effect  on earnings  because  they  enhance  individual
workers'  productivity.  The  proxies  for  formal  education  are  three  splines  for
years  of schooling  at  primary,  secondary  and  post-secondary  levels,  and  public
school  attendance.  Work  experience  is  proxied  by years  of tenure  in  the
current  job,  and  by the  usual  measure  of  years  of  potential  work  experience.
The  empirical  specification  extends  the  standard  model  to include  several
personal  and family  background  factors,  as  well as  place  of residence  in order
to capture  regional  differences  in  cost  of living. The  analysis  of the
effects  of training  in  the  nonwage  sector  also  includes  business'  total
capital,  number  of  hired  workers,  and  number  of family  workers. The  effect  of
job-training  on  wage rates  is estimated  by the  set  of dummy  variables  defined
in  Annex  A, Table  A-1.
1.  Vage  Workers
Table  6 presents  estimates  of the  wage  model  adjusted  for  self-selection
in training  courses  for  the  pooled  sample  of salaried  workers.  For  comparative
purposes  OLS  estimates  are  also  presented. Annex  C, Table  C-1  presents
separate  estimates  of the  subsamples  of  workers  with  and  without  training.
Table  6
Wage  Functions  for  Wage  Workers  OLS  and  Selectivity  Adjusted
Independent  Selectivity  Simple
variables  Adjusted  OLS
(1)  (2)
Constant  -0.350*  -0.356*
(2.48)  (2.52)
Potential  experience  0.038*  0.040*
(5.27)  (5.76)
Potential  experience  squared  -0.0004*  -0.0004*
(3.41)  (3.62)
Tenure  on current  job  0.038*  0.036*
(4.84)  (4.62)
Tenure  on current  job  squared  -0.0009*  -0.0008*
(3.79)  (3.59)
Spline  primary  0.080*  0.080*
(2.78)  (2.79)- 30 -
Spline  secondary  0.059*  0.071*
(3.91)  (5.88)
Spline  higher  0.119*  0.117*
(8.54)  (8.37)
Last  school  attended  was  public  -0.060  -0.074
(1.01)  (1.25)
Father's  years  of schooling  0.028*  0.028*
(4.14)  (4.20)
Mother's  years  of schooling  0.021*  0.022*
(2.92)  (2.93)
Married  or as if  0.176*  0.173*
(3.33)  (3.27)
Lima  0.162*  0.170*
(3.90)  (4.10)
Lambda  (X)  -0.132
(1.38)
Training  dummy  0.135*  0.128*
(2.13)  (2.64)
R2 adjusted  0.382  0.380
Mean depend.  variable  1.398  1.398
No.  observations  1,259  1,259
Notes: *  Statistically  significant  at the  10  percent  level  or  better.
t-values  in  parentheses.
Table  6 shows  that  participation  in  job-training  programs  has  a
positive  and  significant  effect  on the  wage rates  of private  sector  employees.
Training  increases  wage rates  by over  10  percent  after  controlling  for  the
effects  of schooling,  work experience,  background,  and  even  the  probability  of
entering  training  courses.
With regard  to schooling,  the  rate  of return  to an additional  year
of schooling  decreases  between  primary  and secondary  education,  and  then
increases  between  secondary  and  post-secondary  education.  Regarding  the
selectivity  factor,  the  estimated  coefficient  on X  is  not significant22/
22/  See  X for  each  subsample  in  Annex  C'.. Table  C-1.- 31 -
indicating  that  despite  the  observed  differences  between  workers  with  and
without  training,  there  is  no evidence  of the  impact  of unobserved  self-
selection  in  the  determination  of the  observed  average  wage rates.
Consistently,  a comparison  of the  selectivity  corrected  and  the  simple  OLS
estimates  shows  that  most coefficients  do not  experience  significant  changes
as  a result  of accounting  for  self-selection  in training.
It could  be argued  that  institutional  features  of the  labor  market
may  determine  the  higher  average  pay  of  trained  workers  because  they  acquire
better  jobs. However,  estimates  including  firm  size  and  unionization  do  not
lend  support  to that  interpretation.23/  Given  that  urban  areas  outside  Lima
include  a collection  of citiesi4 of different  degrees  of  urbanization,
significant  regional  biases  could  arise. However,  estimates  controlling  by
city  size  did  not  verify  the  presence  of such  biases. An alternative
explanation,  tested  below,  suggests  that  trained  workers  may  be paid  a  wage
premium  as a consequence  of  employers'  efforts  to  attract  more  qualified
workers.
In general,  the  figures  of  Table  6 are  indicative  of the  strong
influence  of  parental  schooling  on  workers'  wage rates,  as  might  be expected
in  a country  stratified  along  socioeconomic  and  cultural  lines  such  as  Peru.
Each  additional  year  of father's  and  mother's  schooling  increases  the  son's
wage rate  by 3 and  2 percentage  points  respectively.  Marital  status  also  has
a  positive  impact  on the  wages  of  workers  with  no training  suggesting  that
employers  may  use  this  information  as  an indicator  of reliability  and  job
commitment.
There  is some  evidence  (Greenhalgh  and  Stewart,  1987,  Lillard  and
Tan,  1986)  that  the  skills  acquired  through  job-training  depreciate  within  a
decade  or so.  To  detect  over  time  erosion  of the  training  effect,  the  timing
of the  training  course  was included  in the  wage functions.  Two  proxies  were
tested: the  number  of years  since  the  training  event,  and  a dummy  equal  to 1
if training  was  undertaken  after  1980. Contrary  to expectations,  the
estimates  did  not indicate  that  the  effect  of training  on  wage rates  erode
over  time. Nevertheless,  this  outcome  should  be examined  cautiously  because
this  accounts  for  only  the  longest  course. The  proxies  may  be also  capturing
the  effects  of shorter  courses  taken  during  these  years,  which  could  conceal
the  depreciation  of training  over  time.
23/  The firm  size  variables  (see  Table  1)  were  tested  at different
levels  of aggregation  without  significant  results  in any  specification  or
sample. Having  a union  in  the  firm,  did  not show  any  impact  on  wage rates
either.
24/  There  are  13  cities  ranked  by size  as follows:  Arequipa  (over
500,000  inhabitants),  Trujillo  (over  400,000  inhabitants),  Chiclayo  and
Chimbote  (over  300,000  inhabitants  each),  Piura,  Ica,  Tacna,  Cajamarca,
Huancayo,  Cuzco,  Puno,  Iquitos  and  towns  around  Lima,  each  with less  than
200,000  inhabitants.- 32 -
The  relationship  between  wage rates  and  general  and specific  job
experience  exhibit  the  expected  significance  and  behavior. In order  to
investigate  the  relationship  between  specific  training  and  other  forms  of
human  capital  investment,  interactive  models  were  tested  on the  experience  and
schooling  variables  with  participation  in job-training  (in  general  and  by
source). Whether  the  interactive  terms  increase  or decrease  the  effect  of
training  indicr.es  complementarity  or substitutability  between  these  factors,
respectively.  The  results  of this  exercise  did  not  provide  enough  evidence  to
draw  general  conclusions.  However,  there  are  three  particular  findings  worthy
of  mention. First,  there  is significant  substitutability  between  higher
education  and  post-secondary  training. Second,  there  appears  to  be
significant  complementarity  between  training  in  job-based  programs  and  job-
specific  experience.  Third,  there  appears  to  be significant  complementarity
between  potential  experience  and  academes  training. (See  estimates  in
Annex  C, Table  C-2.)
Training  Effects  by Type  of Training  Institution
This section  discusses  whether  training  received  from  the  various
types  of institution  yield  different  labor  market  outcomes. The  objective  is
to detect  whether  the  various  types  of institutional  training  arrangements
existing  in  Peru  have  different  degrees  of  effectiveness  in increasing  wage
rates. The  specification  of the  wage  model  reported  here  replaces  the
original  training  variable  by three  dummies  indicating  the  source  of  training.
Training  institutions  were grouped  according  to  the  classification  presented
in Section  II.  They  are: JBP  to indicate  if  the  individual  received  training
in a  job-based  program,  PST  to  indicate  if training  was received  in  a post-
secondary  training  program,  and  ACT to  indicate  if the  individual  trained  in
ar.  academe. Table  7  column  1  displays  selectivity  adjusted  estimates  and
column  2  displa,s  OLS  estimates.
Table  7
Wage Functions  by Type  of Training  Institution
Salaried  Workers
Selection
Independent  Adjusted  OLS
(1)  (2)
Constant  -0.333*  -0.353*
(2.40)  (2.49)
Potential  experience  0.039*  0.040*
(5.53)  (5.67)
Potential  experience  -0.0004*  -0.0004*
squared  (3.4t.)  (3.55)
Tenure  on current  job  0.035*  0.036*- 33 -
(4.59)  (4.64)
Tenure  on current  job  -0.0008*  -0.0008*
squared  (3.64)  (3.62)
Spline  primary  0.080*  0.080*
(2.81)  (2.80)
Spline  secondary  0.072*  0.072*
(5.74)  (5.96)
Spline  higher  0.115*  0.114*
(8.18)  (8.07)
Job  based  training  0.132*  0.141*
(1.70)  (2.17)
Post-secondary  training  0.200*  0.266*
(2.03)  (2.77)
Academe  training  -0.060  -0.029
(0.70)  (0.34)
Lima  0.174*  0.172*
(4.23)  (4.15)
Last  school  attended  -0.076  -0.071
was  public  (1.30)  (1.21)
Father's  years  of  0.029*  0.028*
schooling  (4.22)  (4.19)
Mother's  years  of  0.021*  0.022*
schooling  (2.88)  (2.97)




R2 adjusted  0.384  0.383
No.  observations  1,259  1,259
Notes: *  Statistically  significant  at the  10  percent  level  or  better.
t-  values  in  parentheses.
To avoid  repetition,  the  discussion  that  follows  refers  only  to the
training  variables. Table  7 shows  that  the  various  types  of institutional
arrangements  providing  post-school  training  in  Peru  have  different  impacts  on- 34 -
wages. Thus,  training  received  in  a job-based  program  (JBP)  raises  wage rates
by over  10  percentage  points,  and  training  received  in  a post-secondary
training  program  (PST)  raise  wage  rates  by over  20  percentage  points. In
contrast,  training  received  in academes  does  not  have  any  significant  impact
on  wage rates. These  results  suggest  that  training  provided  by job-based  and
post-secondary  organizations  are  effective  means  to  enhance  wage rates  while
"academes"  seem  to  be ineffective.  The  lack  of impact  of academes  on  wages  is
rather  surprising.  Because  they  are  a for-profit  operation,  their  success
would  be presumed  to depend  directly  on the  labor  market  performance  of their
trainees. Possily  academes  provide  benefits  other  than  through  wages;  perhaps
they  are  ineffective,  but  people  do  not find  that  out  easily,  and  so  take
courses  because  of their  low  cost. The  data  available  in  the  Peruvian  survey
do  not  allow  more detailed  examination  of these  issues  not  permitting
conclusions  as to  whether  the  government  should  intervene  in these
organizations.  However,  given  the  proportion  of  workers  that  seek  training  in
these  institutions  in  urban  Peru,  and  the  lack  of information  on their
activities,  they  should  be the  subject  of further  research. The  expansion  of
similar  proprietary  training  institutions  seems  to  be a  matter  of concern  for
the  training  subsectors  of Colombia  and  Brazil  (Dougherty,  1986).
The  Effect  of Certification
In this  section  the  distinction  between  the  effect  of receiving
training  with or  without  a certificate  on  wage rates  is  explored. Unlike  the
case  of formal  education,  there  are  training  programs  which  do  not  provide  a
diploma  to trainees  upon  completion,  and  the  PLSS  data  do  not  distinguish
between  completers  without  certificates  and  drop-outs. Therefore,  only
tentative  conclusions  can  be reached  with  regard  to  the  effect  of training
certification.  A significant  effect  of  diplomas  may indicate  that  training
not  only  increases  workers'  productivity,  but  also  provides  a "signal"  to
employers  to select  potentially  more  productive  workers. Holding  a
certificate  may differentiate  individuals  by innate  'ability". If  certificate
holders  actually  learn  more in  a training  program  than  dropouts,  holding  a
diploma  may  also  indicate  a true  training  effect.
The  effect  of credentials  is  estimated  by replacing  the  original
training  variable  by two  dummies  indicating  job-training  with and  without  a
certificate25/.  Table  8 presents  two  specifications  of the  basic  wage  model.
The  first  specification  (1)  includes  the  training-certificate  dummies.
Specification  (2)  adds  total  hours  of training  received  in the  longest  course
as a  means  to  control  for  the  effect  of intensity  or  amount  of training
received. As before,  OLS  and  selection  adjusted  estimates  are  presented.
25/  When  both  dummies  are  zero,  the  untrained  group  is selected. See
definitions  in  Annex  A, Table  A-1.- 35 -
Table  8
Wage Functions  and  Certification  Effects Salaried  Workers
Selection  Adiusted  OLS
Independent  Model  Model  Model  Model
variables  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Constant  -0.354*  0.354*  -0.352*  0.354*
(2.52)  (2.52)  (2.49)  (2.49)
Potential  experience  0.038*  0.038*  0.040*  0.040*
(5.29)  (5.30)  (5.72)  (5.72)
Potential  experience  -0.0004*  -0.0004*  -0.0004*  -0.0004*
squared  (3.42)  (3.40)  (3.60)  (3.60)
Tenure  on current  job  0.037*  0.037*  0.035*  0.035*
(4.75)  (4.76)  (4.57)  (4.58)
Tenure  on current  job  -0.0009*  -0.0009*  -0.0008*  -0.0009*
squared  (3.70)  (3.71)  (3.54)  (3.55)
Spline  primary  0.078*  0.079*  0.079*  0.079*
(2.74)  (2.75)  (2.75)  (2.76)
Spline  secondary  0.058*  0.058*  0.071*  0.071*
(3.63)  (3.60)  (5.89)  (5.84)
Spline  higher  0.116*  0.117*  0.115*  0.118*
(8.31)  (8.34)  (8.18)  (8.20)
Dummy  training  without 0.238  0.219  0.029  0.011
diploma  (1.23)  (1.12)  (0.40)  (0.14)
Dummy  training  with  0.395*  0.374*  0.188*  0.169*
diploma  (2.1?)  (1.99)  (3.24)  (2.63)
Hours  longest  course  0.039  0.040
(/1000)  (0.69)  (0.70)
Last  school  attended  -0.050  -0.051  -0.066  -0.066
was  public  (0.85)  (0.85)  (1.12)  (1.12)
Father's  years  of  0.028*  0.029*  0.028*  0.028*
schooling  (4.23)  (4.24)  (4.16)  (4.17)
Mother's  years  of  0.022*  0.022*  0.022*  0.022*
schooling  (3.02)  (2.99)  (3.00)  (2.97)
Married  or as if  0.174*  0.173*  0.172*  0.172*
(3.29)  (3.28)  (3.23)  (3.23)- 36 -
Lima  0.165*  0.164*  0.173*  0.173*
(3.92)  (3.92)  (4.18)  (4.16)
Lambda  ()  -0.128  -0.129
(1.15)  (1.16)
R2 adjusted  0.383  0.385  0.384  0.383
Mean dependent  variable  1.398  1.398  1.398  1.398
No. observations  1,259  1,259  1,259  1,259
Notes:  *  Statistica,ly  significant  at the  10  percent  level  or better.
t-values  in  parentheses.
Both  specifications  show  a significant  effect  associated  with
receiving  training  and  a diploma. This  effect  remains  significant  even  in the
presence  of amount  of training  received  (measured  in  hours).26/ This  result
may  be indicating  a certification  effect,  a learning  effect  if  completers
learn  more per  hour  of training  than  drop-outs  do,  and  a completion  effect  if
the  nature  of the  training  program  is such  that  individuals  need  to conclude
the  program  before  mastering  the  skills  taught. Training  without  diploma  does
not show  an impact  on  wage rates. Since  this  category  includes  completers  as
well  as drop-outs,  the  implications  of this  finding  are  unclear. A
reestimation  of these  models  for  each  of the  sources  of training  (not  shown
here)  indicates  that  the  impact  of certificates  varies  by provider. Receiving
training  and  a diploma  in  a  PST  program  was found  to increase  the  wage rate  by
over  30  percentage  points,  while  receiving  training  and  a  diploms  in a  JBP  was
found  to increase  the  wage rate  by about  15 percentage  points.
2.  Self-employed  Vorkers
Because  of the  difficulties  in  obtaining  a reliable  measure  of
income  from  non-farm  self-employment  activities,  this  section  not  only
estimates  the  effects  of training  on the  hourly  wage rates  of the  self-
employed,  but also  estimates  the  effects  of training  on their  enterprise's
profits. First  wage functions  estimates  using  self-reported  earnings  are
presented,  followed  by estimates  of  profit  functions  using  enterprise  level
information.
26/  Hours  of the  longest  training  course  is likely  to  be a poor  proxy
for  actual  training  received. Results  similar  to these  were obtained  in
Colombia  when using  data  on  hours  of training  in SENA  from  a labor  force
survey  (Encuesta  de  Educacion  y Fuerza  de Trabajo,  CCRP,  1975)  while  results
of specially  designed  training  surveys  indicated  otherwise  (Reyes  y Gomez,
1979). Additional  attempts  were  made to  test  the  effect  of length  of training
on  hourly  wage rates. In spite  of the  various  linear  and  non-linear  forms
used,  no evidence  of the  impact  of training  duration  on  wages  was found.- 37 -
The  self-employed  did  not report  the  value  of earnings  by component,
but  only  th,e  nominal  value  of  the "total  earnings,  obtained  from  the
business271. This  self-reported  "business  income"  may  be inaccurately
measured  for  several  reasons. First,  it is  not  certain  whether  it reflects
income  earned  by the  individual  or  by all  individuals  working  in  the
enterprise. Second,  this  income  is likely  to  be biased,  because  most family
businesses  do  not  keep  detailed  records  of costs  and  revenues;  because  they
carry  out  a significant  amount  of  non-monetary  transactions  with their
customers  and  suppliers;  and  because  there  is an important  amount  of
consumption  by the  household  of  enterprise  goods  and  services.
In addition  to the  problems  of  measurement  of the  dependenl:
variable,  the  specification  of the  wage  equation  for  the  self-employed  differs
from  that  of employees  for  at least  two  reasons. First,  the  wage equation  for
the  self-employed  should  separate  the  returns  to  physical  capital  and  assets,
and separate  other  labor  inputs  (mostly  family  labor)  from  the  returns  to  the
self-employed  individual's  human  capital. Second,  the  wage  equation  for  the
self-employed  should  account  for  managerial  ability  and  risk  taking 28'.
Table  9  presents  OLS  and  selection  corrected  estimates  of the  wage
model. In addition  to  human  capital,  family  background  and  location
variables,  a  vector  of enterprise  characteristics  is  included: total  capital,
the  number  of  hired  workers  in  the  business  during  the  period  the  reported
income  was generated,  and  the  number  of other  household  members  who  worked  in
the  business  during  the  same  period. The  business  variables  are  expected  to
have  a significant  impact  on  wage rates,  accounting  for  the  role  of  physical
factors  of  production  and  other  labor  inputs. They  are  also  expected  to
lessen  potential  biases  on the  parameter  estimates  of the  human  capital
27/  See  definition  in  Annex  A, Table  A-1.
28/  Evidence  on the  relationship  between  formal  education  and  earnings
among  non-farm  self-employed  workers  is  not  abundant,  partly  due  to
difficulties  of separating  returns  to labor  and  to  non-human  assets.
Empirical  studies  using  the  earnings  function  approach  do  not  provide
consistent  results. Chiswick  (1976)  reports  that  the  rates  of return  to
education  in  the  self-employed  sector  are  lower  than  those  in the  wage sector.
Fields  and  Schultz  (1982)  find  little  difference  in  the  returns  to  human
capital  variables  betwjeen  the  two  groups  of  workers. Henderson  (1982)
compares  individuals  performing  similar  jobs  and  finds  that  the  returns  to
schooling  for  the  self-employed  are  equal  to those  of  wage  workers. Blau
(1986)  finds  that  formal  education  is  apparently  not  advantageous  for  the
self-employed,  while  wage  workers  exhibit  the  expected  returns  to schooling.
Psacharopoulos,  Arriagada  and  Velez  (1987)  find  that  returns  to education  are
similar  for  self-employed  and  salaried  workers. In general,  applications  of
the  earnings  function  framework  to  the  self-employed  have  not  performed  well
in  identifying  the  determinants  of  non-wage  non-farm  income  (Chiswick,  1976;
Henderson,  1982;  Vijverberg,  1985;  Blau,  1986;  Soon,  1987). Other  research
has  used the  self-employed  as the  non-screened  sector  to test  whether
schooling  enhances  productivity  (Wolpin,  1977;  Psacharopoulos,  1980;  Jamison
and  Lau, 1982,  Jamison  and  Moock,  1984).- 38 -
variables. Annex  C, Table  C-3  presents  separate  estimates  of the  subsamples
of individuals  with and  without  training.
Table 9
Wage  Functions  for  Self-employed  Workers
OLS  and  Selectivity  Adjusted
Independent
variables  Selectivity  Adiusted  Simple  OLS
Constant  0.032  0.342
(0.16)  (0.17)
Potential  experience  0.038*  0.037*
(4.22)  (4.07)
Potential  experience  -0.060*  -0.060*
squared  (/100)  (3.89)  (3.79)
Tenure  on current  job  0.005  0.009
(0.60)  (0.96?
Tenure  on current  job  0.009  0.003
squared (/100)  (O  38)  (0.13)
Spline  primary  0.036  0.040
(1.10)  (1.20)
Spline  secondary  0.064*  0.051*
(3.39)  (2.95)
Spline  higher  0.073*  0.067*
(3.50)  (3.21)
Last school  attended  -0.073  -0.001
was  public  (0.82)  (0.02)
Father's  years  of  0.008  -0.049
schooling  (0.79)  (0.55)
Mother's  years  of  0.028*  0.007
schooling  (2.52)  (0.64)
Lives  in  Lima  dummy  0.124*  0.027*
(2.13)  (2.41)
Total  capital  of  0.056*  0.111*
enterprise  (/1,000)  (5.59)  (1.90)
Number  hired  workers  0.023*  0.056*- 39 -
in  wnterprise  (2.23)  (5.52)
Number  family  workers  -0.003  0.025*
in  enterprise  (1.24)  (2.34)
Training  dummy  -0.450  -0.003
(1.56)  (1.12)
X  selectivity  factor  0.266
(1.62)
R2 adjusted  0.171  0.170
Mean  dependent  1.402  1.402
variable
No.  observations  925  925
Notes: *  Statistically  significant  at the  10  percent  level  or better.
t-  values  in  parentheses.
As seen  in  Table  9,  the  wage-function  approach  does  not  perform  well
in explaining  variation  of self-employment  earnings,  in spite  of the  inclusion
of  enterprise  characteristics  in the  model. The  coefficients  on enterprise
variables  confirm  that  in fact  some  of the  self-reported  income  is return  to
non-labor  inputs.
A comparison  of these  estimates  with those  for  the  wage  workers
(Table  6) shcws  significant  differences  in the  earnings  structure  of  wage  and
self-emploment  activities,  in  the  role  of schooling  in  earnings  determination,
in the  age-earnings  profiles  of the  workers  in  each  sector,  and  in  the  impact
of job-training  on  hourly  earnings. Compared  to  the  returns  to schooling  of
the  sample  of  wage  workers,  these  results  indicate  that  the  self-employed  have
significantly  lower  returns  to  primary  and  post-secondary  education,  and
similar  returns  to secondary  education.  The  returns  to  potential  experience
exhibit  the  expected  life-cycle  shape,  and  its  impact  on  earnings  seems  to be
similar  to  that  found  among  wage  workers. However,  the  returns  to job-
specific  experience  are  not  significant,  implying  that  tenure  on the  current
job  does  not increase  productivity  as  measured  by hourly  wages.  It  could  be
argued  that  this  flat  job-specific  experience-earnings  profile  is  due  to the
lack  of  on-the-job  investment  among  the  self-employed.  Alternatively,  the
lack  of impact  of tenure  on  wage rates  could  be due  to  a large  number  of the
self-employed  performing  jobs  that  by definition  do  not require  any  skill
development.  Prior  evidence  (Henderson,  1982,  Teihlet-Waldorf  and  Waldorf,
1983)  suggests  that  both  arguments  hold in  the  case  of street  vendors,  but  not
in  the  case  of other  self-employed.
Table  9  also  shows  no effect  of  job-training  on self-employed  wage
rates. There  are  several  possible  interpretations  of this  finding. Pirst,
because  of the  variety  of roles  this  group  of  workers  perform  operating  a
business  (allocative,  supervisory,  etc.)  they  do  not  benefit  from  occupation-- 40 -
specific  trainingn!/.  Second,  the  positive  effect  of training  might  be
dampened  by the  presence  of a large  group  of "retail  vendors  and  hawkers".
However,  estimates  excluding  the  group  of  vendors  did  not  alter  the  results
presented  in  Table  10.  Third,  the  relationship  of  wages  and  education  and
training  for  the self-employed  may  be  highly  nonlinear  for  the  highest  levels
of education. Bourgouignon  (1980),  and  Fredland  and  Little  (1981)  argue  that
estimates  of the  returns  to  education  for  the  self-employed  are  biased  if  a
sample  dominated  by  vendors  and  peddlers  includes  a few  highly-educated  high-
income  professionals  (lawyers,  physicians,  and  the  like). However,  when
professionals  were excluded  from  the  sample  the  results  in  Table  9 again  did
not  change. Fourth,  job-training  may  have  an indirect  effect  on  wage rates
through  its  relation  with other  variables. Specifications  including
interaction  terms  of training  with schooling,  job  tenure,  and  general
experience  were estimated.  However,  the  results  obtained  do  not  verify  any
such  argument. In spite  of these  interpretations,  the  issue  of  why self-
employed  individuals  would  choose  to receive  training  remains,  with  no
satisfactory  answer. These  workers  might  have invested  in training  while  in
previous  salaried  employment,  or in  the  hope  of  obtaining  employment  in the
wage sector. The  persistent  instability  of the  Peruvian  economy  may  provide
individuals  with additional  incentives  to  train,  where  training  for
alternative  jobs  may  be taken  as  a  hedge  to cope  with the  chronic  recession,
unemployment,  and  rapid  inflation  experienced  by Peru  since  the  mid 1970s.
With  regard  to business  characteristics,  a strong  and  positive
impact  of total  capital  and  hired  labor  was found  on hourly  wage rates. Each
additional  worker  in  the  business  increases  the  hourly  earnings  of the  self-
employed  by over  2  percent. Bearing  in  mind that  the  amount  of labor  hired  is
likely  to be correlated  with the  success  of a  business,  this  variable  could  be
capturing  the  effect  of unobservable  individual  endowments  such  as  managerial
ability  and  personal  drive. Consistently,  family  workers  do not  seem  to  make
a  contribution  to the  self-employed  income  in  the  enterprise.  It is  unclear
whether  this  lack  of contribution  of family  workers  to the  enterprise  income
arises  from  their  low  productivity,  or to  the  manner  in  which  income  is shared
in the  householdr 30/.  Finally,  ceteris  paribus,  wage rates  are  higher  in  Lima.
This  may reflect  not  only  cost  of living  differences,  but  wage differentials
associated  with different  occupational  structures  of self-employment
activities  in  Lima  and  other  cities.
A compa.ison  between  selectivity  adjusted  and  the  OLS  estimates
reveals  some  change  in several  coefficients.  First,  the  returns  to secondary
29/  Fredland  and  Little,  1981  expect  the.self-employed  to  have  fewer
incentives  to get  occupation-specific  training  than  do  wage  workers  in  the
private  sector. First,  they  must  pay  the  full  cost  of  training. Second,  they
are  likely  to benefit  more from  general  training,  since  their  productivity
depends  not  only  on  productive  skills  but  on their  supervisory  and
organizational  skills  as  well.
30/  For  a detailed  discussion  of  non-farm  family  businesses  see,  Moock
and  Stelcner,  'Education  and  Earnings  in  Peru's  Informal  Non-farm  Family
Enterprises',  1988 (forthcoming).- 41 -
and  post-secondary  schooling  increase  after  adjusting  for  the  probability  of
training  participation.  Second,  the  wage advantage  of Lima  rises  after  taking
into  account  self-selection.  These  results  could  be expected  given  that  the
estimated  coefficients  on the  selectivity  variable,  X, show  the  presence  of
selectivity  bias in  the  estimates  for  workers  with no training. See  Annex  C,
Table  C-331.
Profits  and  Training
As pointed  out  earlier,  the  PLSS  gathered  information  not  only  at
the  individuals'  level  but  at  the  household  level. For  those  households  with
non-farm  self-employment  activihties  during  the  year  prior  to  the  survey,  we
have  information  on the  charszteristics,  revenues,  expenses,  and  assets  of the
businesses  operated  by the  self-employed  individuals  under  analysis.
To test  whether  "measurement"  problems  in  self-reported  hourly  wage
rates  contribute  to  the  results  obtained  thts  far,  this  section  estimates  the
impact  of education  and  job-training  on the  natural  log  of monthly  profits  per
hour.  This  variable  was computed  from  revenues  and  expenditures  of the
enterprise  so as  to be fully  comparable  to  hourly  wage rates. The  analysis  is
restricted  to those  enterprises  operated  by one  worker  that  had  positive
profits  at the  time  of the  survey  or during  the  last  month  they  were in
operation. These  are  331  individuals  who represent  about  36  percent  of the
overall  sample  of self-employed.  Individuals  in  one-worker  enterprises  show,
on average,  similar  education,  job  tenure,  and  labor  supply  behevior  to that
of the  full  sample  during  the  last  12  months321. Few  features  appear  to
distinguish  them  significantly  from  the  rest  of  the  self-employed:  they  are,
on average,  2  years  older;  and  as expected,  have less  physical  capital  in  the
business. They  were found  performing  similar  occupations  in  the  same
311  Positive  selection  of "non-trainees"  was found,  indicating  that  the
average  wage distribution  observed  for  non-trained  relf-employed  is actually
higher  than  it  would  have  been for  the  average  individual  in  the  subsample  had
he received  training.  That  is,  the  average  wage rate  of non-trained  self-
employed  with given  personal  characteristics  exceeds  what  that  wage rate  would
have  been for  individuals  with the  same  characteristics  who instead  received
training. It is  necessary  to keep  in  mind  that  the  signs  of the  coefficients
on the  selectivity  variables  depend  on the  variance  of the  error  terms  of the
participation,  and  the  trained  and  untrained  wage equations. If there  are
"unobservables",  unmeasured  factors  common  to all  equations,  this  type  of
result  may  be obtained. In  this  case,  the  "costs"  of undertaking  job-training
are  not  considered  in  the  model,  and  this  omission  could  be the  sour.ce  of
positive  selection  in the  untrained  group.
32/  In  the  case  of enterprises  with  more than  one  worker,  it is
difficult  to separate  the  particular  self-employed  labor  and  business  income
from  those  of family  and  hired  workers. In addition,  in  the  presence  of
unpaid  family  workers  the  total  salary  bill  cannot  be computed,  and  hence,
profits  cannot  be calculated  without  imputing  "a  wage rate"  for  these  workers.
For  details  see,  Moock  and  Stelcner,  1989  (forthcoming),  op.cit.- 42 -
industries  (see  Annex  2 for  key  variables  mean  values  for  one-worker
enterprises).
Sample  size  considerations  influenced  the  empirical  specification
presented  here.  Table  10 shows  hourly  profits  equations  in  columns  1 and  2.
For  comparative  purposes,  wage  functions  on the  natural  log  of  hourly  wages
are  shown  in columns  3 and  4.
Table  10
Self-employed  Workers:  Determinants  of Hourly  Profits
and  Wage  Rates  (one  worker  enterprises)
Independent  Hourly  Profits  Hourly  Wages
variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  0.571  0.339*  0.748*  0.555*
(4.07)  (2.01)  (7.82)  (4.81)
Years  of schooling  0.076*  0.092*  0.075*  0.093*
(4.33)  (4.93)  (6.26)  (7.33)
Total  capital  0.021*  0.020*  0.008*  0.007*
(/1,000)  (6.52)  (6.21)  (3.57)  (3.23)
Training  dummy  -0.027  0.080  -0.008*  0.007*
(0.14)  (0.42)  (0.46)  (0.002)
Age of enterprise  0.017*  0.014*
(years)  (2.76)  (3.28)
Enterprise  operates  a/  -0.401*  -0.262*
(2.41)  (2.32)
Fixed  location  b/  0.078  -0.244*
enterprise  (0.07)  (1.99)
R2 adjusted  0.178  0.203  0.156  0.187
Mean dependent  variable  1.329  1.329  1.377  1.377
Number  of  observations  331  331  331  331
Notes:  *  Statistically  significant  at the  10  percent  level  or  better.
t- values  in  parentheses.
a/ Omitted  category: enterprise  operates  in the  street  (mobile).
b/ Special  premises  for  the  business  outside  the  home.
A comparison  of the  estimates  on  hourly  profits  and  hourly  wage
rates  reveals  first,  that  even  though  the  mean  values  of  hourly  profits  and- 43 -
hourly  wages  have  significantly  different  distributions,  both  measures  provide
similar  and  precisely  estimated  values  of the  returns  to  schooling  and
training  among  these  self-employed  workers. Table  10  confirms  the  earlier
results  with regard  to job-training:  it  does  not  have  an impact  on the
economic  returns  to self-employment.  The  table  also  confirms  the  significant
contribution  of schooling  to those  returns,  measured  either  as  wages  or
profits.- 44 -
VI.  CONCLUSION
This  study  finds  that  post-school  training  is  widespread  among
Peruvian  male  workers  in  urban  areas. Over  21  percent  of the  wage  workers  and
about  14  percent  of the  self-employed  have  received  at least  one  post-school
training  course  between  1975  and  1985-86. The  probability  that  salaried  males
will receive  training  does  not  appear  to  be influenced  by city  of residence,
suggesting  that  workers  from  Lima  and  OUAs  wage  sectors  face  similar  training
opportunities.  For  the  nonwage  sector  findings  suggest  otherwise: those  in
Lima  have  more  training  opportunities  than  those  in  OUAs.
With regard  to  the  training  event,  in  general,  the  longest  job-
training  event  in  a  worker's  life  does  not  take  place  upon  entry  in  the labor
market,  but  after  several  years  of  work experience.  The  average  participant
received  training  his  mid-twenties  after  about  9 years  in  the labor  market,
From  the  point  of  view  of enrollments,  job-based  programs,  that  is,  on-the-job
or off-the-job  courses  received  from  public  sectoral  training  institutes  of
the  military  are  the  most important  source  of  post-school  training  among  wage
and  self-employed  workers  in  Peru (46  and  40  percent  of trainees,
respectively).  Twenty  percent  of  the  wage  workers  and  13  percent  of the  self-
employed  received  training  from  post-secondary  training  institutions.
Unexpectedly,  "academes",  the  prototype  of the  proprietary  training
institution,  appear  as the  second  most important  source  of training  among
urban  males (24  and  29  percent  of  trainees  in  the  wage  and  nonwage  sectors,
respectively).  This  situation  suggests  that  the  Peruvian  training  sector
needs  to examine  the  operations  and  effectiveness  of this  type  of  proprietary
training  school  to determine  their  role  in  the  sector.
With regard  to  beneficiaries  of training  programs,  workers  with less
than  secondary  schooling,  which  constitute  over  50 percent  of the  urban  male
labor  force  in  Peru,  do not  receive  job-skills  from  the  institnitional  training
system. Moreover,  the  analysis  of selection  into  training  indicates  that  the
probability  of receiving  train:ing  is  largely  determined  by educational
attainment,  where  secondary  schooling  is  the  lowest  entry  level  into  training
courses,  revealing  that  in  the  case  of Peru,  training  and  formal  education  are
indeed  complementary.  These  findings  apply  to  workers  in  both  the  wage and
nonwage  sectors. There  appear  to be several  implications  for  policymakers.
First,  in Peru,  workers  with limited  schooling  also  face  limited  training
opportunities.  This  situation  may arise  because  of a lack  of post-school
training  programs  for  individuals  with little  schooling,  or because  of low
demand  for  training  in this  group  population.  However,  the  scarce  available
data  on the  largest  public  sectoral  training  agencies  suggest  that  because  of
high  demand,  they  select  participants  based  on  educational  attainment,  eveai
though  many training  courses  do not  require  secondary  schooling. Second,  to
the  extent  that  most training  institutions  in  Peru  are  subsidized,  and  that
they  benefit  a  group  of  users  who also  received  subsidized  secondary  and  post-
secondary  schooling,  the  issues  of efficiency  and  equity  in  financing  Peruvian
education  sector  reach  the  vocational  training  sector.
With regard to the labor market effects of post-school training,  the
main impact  of training  concerns  earnings. Among  wage  workers  in  the  private
sector,  training  does  increase  workers'  wage rates,  after  controlling  for  many- 45 -
other  factors  including  formal  schooling  and  the  probability  of having
received  training. When distinguishing  among  types  of training  institution
and  also  controlling  for  other  factors  including  schooling  and  the  probability
of  having  received  training,  the  effects  are  as follows. First,  training
received  from  job-based  programs  increases  workers'  wage  rates  by over 10
percent. Second,  training  received  from  post-secondary  programs  increases
workers'  wage rates  by 20  percent. Third,  training  received  from  "academes",
the  prctotype  of  the  proprietary  school,  does  not  have  any  impact  on  workers'
wage rates. Thus,  it  may  be concluded  that  the  training  institutions  offering
job-based  and  post-secondary  programs  are  effective  means  to  enhance  employee
productivity,  and  academes  are  not. When  distinguishing  between  training
leading  to a diploma  and  training  that  does  not,  the  positive  effect  of
training  holds  for  the  former  but  not  for  the  latter,  even  when length  of the
training  event  is  taken  into  account. However,  given  limitations  on the
certification  data  available,  no interpretation  of this  finding  can  be
substantiated.
Among  the  self-employed  workers,  post-school  training  does  not  have
the  expected  positive  impact  on the  earnings  or  profits  of these  workers,
after  controlling  for  other  factors  including  enterprise  characteristics,
formal  schooling  and  the  probability  of  having  received  training. These
findings  should  be interpreted  cautiously  because  of the  measurement  problems
associated  with earnings  from  self-employment  activities.  Keeping  this  caveat
in  mind,  these  results  could  be interpreted  as  providing  evidence  that
training  is  not  of  much  use for  the  self-employed  because  they  perform
traditional  jobs  that  by definition  do  not  need  any  ski'll  development.
However,  it  is difficult  to accept  this  argument  for  those  self-employed
working  in  the  craft  or  workshop  subsectors.  Alternatively,  it  could  be
argued  that  the  institutions  that  constitute  the  Peruvian  training  system  are
oriented  to serve  the  training  needs  of the  modern  sector  of the  economy,  and
therefore,  do  not  have  the  kinds  of training  that  would  increase  self-employed
workers'  productivity.
In general,  the  results  of this  study  imply  that  investments  in
training  have  significant  benefits  vis  a  vis formal  schooling,  when related  to
wage  employment  in  the  private  sector  of the  economy. However,  since  no
information  is available  on  the "costs"  of the  post-school  training
investments  examined  in  this  study,  the  results  presented  should  not  be




Definition of the Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable  Definition  Equation
TR  WV  WS
Dependent variables
TRAINM  - 1 if did job-training course between 1975
and the PLSS, 0 otherwise  X
COMPTR1  - 1 if did job-training on or off-the-job in
occupational training institutes  or the military,
O otherwise  X
SUPETR1  - 1 if did job-training in a technical institute
or university, 0 otherwise  X
ACADTR1  - 1 if did job-training in an "academe,
(proprietary  institution), 0 otherwise  X
LNWAGE a/  - natural log of the real  hourly wage rate in
the  main occupation (Intis  at June 1986 prices)  X  X
LNPROFIT b/i natural log of the real  hourly profit rate in
the  main occupation (Intis  at June 1986 prices)  X
Experience
GEXPR1  - years of potential  work experience  computed as:
age - 6  - years of schooling - years  of school
repeated  X  x
GEXPR1SQ  - years of potential work experience squared  X  X
GEXPRTR  =  years of potential  work experience  when trained
computed as:  age when trained - 6 - years  of
schooling  when trained - years of school repeated X
XOCM7  = years of job specific experience in main
occupation  X  X
XOCSQM7  - years of job specific experience squared  X  X
Education and Training
LTSECOND  - 1 if 5 - 9 years of schooling,  0 otherwise  X
SECONDRY  = 1 if 9  years of schooling, 0 otherwise  X
LTHIGHER  = 1 if 10-13 years of schooling, 0 otherwise  X
HIGHER  = 1 if 14+  years of schooling, 0 otherwise  X
SPLYRSC1  - years of primary schooling  X  X
SPLYRSC2  = years of secondary schooling  X  X
SPLYRSC3  = years of post-secondary schooling  X  X
TRDIPLA  = 1 if did job-training and did not receive a
diploma  X  X
TRDIPLB  = 1 if did job-training and received a diploma  X  X
THOURS1  = Hours of training of the longest  course (11,000)  X  X
School Characteristics
PUBSCHL  = 1 if last school attended  was public,
0 otherwise  X  X  X- 47 _
FOODSCHL  - 1  if last  primary  school  attended  provided
iree  meals  X
Background  Information
FYR.-SCHL - father's  years  of schooling  X  X  X
MYR-SCHL  - mother's  years  of schooling  X  X
F.AGRIC  -1  if father  was  a farmer  most  of  his life,
O otherwise  X
BORNTWN  - 1 if  was  not  born in  a city,  0 otherwise  X
MIGRTR  - 1 if  had  migrated  when trained,  0  otherwise  X
STUD10  - 1 if  was studying  10 years  before  the  PLSS,
0  otherwise  X
WAGE10  - 1 if  was in salaried  employment  10  years  before
the  PLSS,  0 otherwise  X
SELF10  - 1 if  was in self-employment  10  years  before
the  PLSS,  0  otherwise  X
MARITALO  - 1 if  married  or living  together,  0 otherwise  X  X
Region
LIMA  - 1 if lives  in  metropolitan  Lima,  0 if lives  in
other  urban  areas  (OUAs)  X  X  X
Enterprise  information
AGENTER  - 1 if the  business  was  operated  by the  household
before  he started  working  in it  X
TOTCAP  =  enterprise  total  capital  and  assets  (intis  of
June  1986)  X
FAMLAB  =  number  of family  members  working  in
the  enterprise  X
HIRWRKRS  =  number  of hired  work- -working  in the
enterprise  X
Notes: a/  Wage  workers  reporteds (i)  nominal  values  of the  following
earnings  component: cash,  food,  housing,  clothing,  and  transportation.  Real
monthly  earnings  were calculated  using  regional  consumer  price  indices  where
June 1985  - 100; (ii)  the  number  of  months  worked  in  this  job  during  the  last
12  months;  (iii)  the  usual  number  of  hours  worked  in  this  job  in  the  week
prior  to  the  interview. The  real  hourly  wage rate (RHW)  was calculated  as:
(real  monthly  earnings  x  months  worked)
(annual  hours)
where  annual  hours  were computed  as  usual  weekly  hours  x  months
worked  in  past  year  x 4.33.
Self-employed  did  nor report  the  value  of earnings  by component,  but
only  the  nominal  value  of the  'total  earnings  obtained  from  the  business".
They  also  reported  the  number  of  months  worked  in  the  business  during  the  last
12  months,  and  the  usual  number  of  hours  worked  in  this  job  per  week.  Using
the  same  regional  consumer  price  indices,  a real  hourly  wage rate  was
calculated  as:- 48 -
(real  monthly  earnings  x  months  worked)
(annual  hours  in the  business)
where  annual  hours  were computed  as  usual  weekly  hot:re  in  the  business  x
months  worked  in  past  year  x  4.33
b/ In the  enterprise  section  of the  PLSS,  data  on revanues  and  expenditures  of
the  enterprise  during  two  weeks  before  the  survey  were collected. Hourly
profits  were calculated  using  the  following  information: (i)  the  value  of
sales  in cash (SC),  (ii)  the  monetary  value  of  payments  in  kind received  by
the  enterprise  (SK),  (iii)  the  value  of  all  expenses  in  the  business  (EX).
For  those  enterprises  that  did  not  operate  during  those  two  weeks,
the  same  data  were  collected  for  the  last  full  month  of operation. For  the
businesses  reporting  biweekly  sales  and  expenditures  those  two  weeks  of
operations  were  assumed  typical,  and  monthly  profits  (MP)  were  computed  ass
(SC +  SK - EX)
Based  on the  same  criteria  used  to compute  hourly  wage rates,  hourly  profits
(HP)  were calculated  as:
(MP  x months  worked  per  year)
(annual  hours)
vhere  annual  hours  were computed  as  usual  weekly  hours  x months  worked  in  the
past  year  x 4.33- 49  -
ANNEX  a
Table  5-1
Wage Workers: Main  Occupation  and  Industry  of Employmenc
During  the  Last  7  Days
(No  Training)
% ItNUSTRV IAGRICUL I  MINING IMANUFAC lELECTRICICONSTRUCICOMMERCE1TRANSPORIFINANC 'OTHER  I
ITURE  I  1TuRe  GAS  atION  I  ITATION  CIAL  SERVICESI
iPISHiNG I  WATER  I  I  I  I
OCCUPATION  X  IFORISTRVI  I  I  I  I  I 
TOTAL
PROfESSIONAL  1/ I  0.00 I  4.76  I  12.70  6.35 I  3.17 i  6.35 I  12.70 I  17.46 I  36.51 i  63
2/  I  0.00 I  7.89 !  2.93 i  30.77 i  2.13 I  2.08 1  7.34 1  18.33 I  '9.33 i  6.53
GOVERNMENT  I  0.00 I  11.11 I  44.44 I  0.00 I  5.56 I  5.56 i  5.56 I  '6.67 I  11.11  I  i8
ADMINISTRATION  I  0.00 i  5.26  2.93 I  0.00 I  1.06 j  0.52 i  0.92 I  5.00 I  1.66 1  1.87
CLERICAL  i  2.27 I  0.76 i  12.12  1.52 i  2.27 i  21.97 I  21.97 i  25.00 i  12.12 !  132
I  4.48 I  2.63 I  5.86  15.38 I  3.19  15.10 I  26.61  '  55.00 I  13.45 113.68
SALES VENDORS  I  0.00 I  0.88 I  9.65  0.00 I  0.00 i  85.96 I  0.00 i  2.63 i  0.88 I  ''4
i  0.00 i  2.63 I  4.03  0.00 I  0.00 1  51.04 i  0.00 !  5.00 i  0.84 1  11.81
SERvtCE  WORKERS  I  2.25  1.12  i  16.85  0.00 i  4.49  i  39.33  i  2.25 i  8.99 i  24.72  i  89
1  2.99 I  2.63 I  5.49 I  0.00 I  4.26 1  18.23 I  *.83 I  13.33  I  '8.49  1  9,22
AGRICULTURAL  FISHI  91.53  1  0.00 I  3.39  i  0.00 I  0.00 I  0.00 I  0.00 I  0.00 i  5.08 I  59
ERV FORESTRv WRKRI  80.60 I  0.00 I  0.73 i  0.00 I  0.00 I  0.00 I  0.00 I  0.00 i  2.52 1  6.11
PRODUCTION TRANS i  1.63 i  6.12 i  43.47 1  1.43  j  17.14 I  5.10 I  14.08 i  0.41 1  10.61 I  490
PORTATION wRKR  i  11.94  i  78.95 i  78.02 !53.85  I  89.36 1  13.02 i  63.30 i  3.33  I  43.70 I  50.78
TOTAL  67  38  273  13  94  192  109  60  -tl9  965
6.94  3.94  28.29  1.35  9.74  19.90  11.30  6.22  12.33  100.00
WAGE WORKERS: MAIN OCCUPATtON AND tNDUSTRV OF EMPLOvMENT
DURING TrIE  LAST 7  DAYS
(WtTH  TRAINING)
\ INOUSTR" IAGRICUL I  MINING IMANUFAC IELECTRtCICONSTRUCICOMWERCEITRANSPORIFINANC  1OTHER  I
!TURE  I  IruRE  IGAS  ITION  I  ITATION  ICIAL  ISERVICESI
IFISHING I  I  IWATER  I  I  I  I
OCCUPATION  ' FORESTRVI  I  I  i  I  I  I  I  iTOTAL
PROFESStONAL  1/ I  0.00 I  2.50 i  22.50 I  2.50 1  5.00 i  7 50 I  2.50 1  22.50 i  36.00 i  40
2/  0.00 I  11.11  1  9.00 1  12.50  9.09 I  5.00 I  5.00 1  27.27 !  38.89 I  13.61
GOvERNMENT  I  0.00  I  11.11  I  55.56  i  0.00  I  0.00  i  11.11  I  11.11  i  11.'I  I  0.00  I  9
ADMINISTRATION  I  0.00  I  11.11  I  S.00  I  0.00 I  0.00 i  1.67 I  5.00 i  3.03 I  0.00 I  3.06
CLERICAL  i  1.47  I  2.94 I  25.00  i  5.88  i  1.47  i  22.06  i  11.76  i  26.47  1  2.94 1  68
1  16.67  I  22.22  i  17.00 I  50.00  I  4.55  1  25.00  !  40.00  I  54.55 I  5.56 I  23.-3
SALES vENDORS  I  0.00 I  0.00  I  17.14 I  0.00  I  0.00  I  77.14  I  0.00  i  2.86  I  2.86  I  35
I  0.00  I  0.00  I  6.00  I  0.00 I  0.00 1  45.00 i  0.00 1  3.03 i  2.78  I  11.90
SERVICE WORKERS  I  0.00 I  0.00  I  5.88 I  0.00  5.88 i  47.06  i  0.00  11.76  1  29.41  I  I7
I  0.00 I  G.00  I  1.00 I  0.00 I  4.SS I  13.33 1  O.C"  G  6.06 1  3.89 i  S.78
AGRICULTURAL  FtSHI  100.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  j  4
ERV FORESTRV  WRKRI  66.67 I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  1  1.36
PRODUCTION  TRANS  |  0.83  1  4.13  i  51.24  1  2.48  1  14.88  i  4.96 i  8.26 1  1.65 1  11.57  12t
PORTATION  WRKR  !  16.67 1  55.56 !  62.00  1  37.50 !  81.82 i  10.00 I  50.00  s  6.06 1  38.89  41.16
TOTAL  6  9  100  8  22  60  20  33  36  294
2.04  3.06  34.01  2.72  7.48  20.41  6.80  11.22  12.24  100.00
NOTES:  I/  ROW PERCENT
2/  COLUMN PERCENT- so  -
ANNEX B
Table B-2
Self-employed  workers:  Main Occupation and Industry of Employment
Durlng the Last 7 Days
(No Training)
\  INOUSTRY  I  NlNG  IMANUPAC  IEL.ECTRIC!CONSTRUCICOMMERCEITRANSPORIFINANC  10H6ER
X  I  ITURE  GAS  ATION  !  ATION  ICIAL  SERVICESI
b  I  !  IwATER  ,  I  TOTAL
OCCUPATION  \  I  I  |  TOT
PROFESSIONAL  1/ I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  1  2.08  1  0.00  1  41.67  I  56.25  1  48
2/  1  0-00  I  0.00  0.  0.00  1  0.32  0.00  1  76.92  1  22.t3  1  6.27
GOVERNMENT  I  0.00  I  77.78  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  11.11  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  11.11  I  9
ADMINtSTRATION  I  0.00  1  5.22  1  0.00  I  0.00  1  0.32  1  0.00  I  0.00 1  0.82  !  .17
CLERICAL  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  1  20.00  1  20.00  1  40.00  1  20.00  I  S
I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  0.00 I  0.32  1  1.14  1  7.69  1  0.82  1  0.65
…________________  --_______.---  ---- _,---------  ------- _,  ------  ---------- _  ----  ----_.  --------.
SALES  vENOORS  I  0.32  1  2.58  1  0.00  I  0.00  1  95.48  1  0.32  1  0.65  1  0.65  1  310
50.00  I  5.97  1  0.00  i  0.00  1  94.57  1.14  1  7.69  i  1.64  1  40.47
…________________.________.---------  ----------------. _-------,_---------  ------- 4.-------- 
SERVtCE  WORKERS  I  0.00  I  10.00  I  0.00  !  0.00  I  30.00  1  12.50  I  5.00  1  42.50  I  40
0.00  1  2.99  !  0.00  I  0.00  1  3.83  1  5.68  1  7.69  1  13.93  1  5.22
…----------------------  --.----.------------- ,  ---------------- _  ----- ____,  -- __  -- __  --------- 
PRODUCTION  TRANS  I  0.28  1  32.49  1  0.85  I  22.03  1  0.56  1  22.88  1  0.00  1  20.90  1  354
PORTATION  WRKR  I  50.00  1  85.82  1  100.00  i 1U0.00  I  0.64  i  92.05  1  0.00  1  60.66  I  46.21
TOTAL  2  134  3  78  313  88  26  122  766
0.26  17.49  0.39  10.18  40.86  11.49  3.39  15.93  100.00
SELF-EMPLOYED  WORKERS&  MAIN  OC:UPATION  ANO  INOUSTRV  OF  EMPLOYMENT
OURING  THE LAST  7 OAYS
(WtTH  TRAINING)
------------------------------------------------------------- __--------------__--
\ INOUSTRV  IMANUFAC  IELECTRICICONSTRuCICOMMERCEITRANSPORIFINANC  OTHER  I
I  TURE  IGAS  ITION  I  ITATION  CIAL  ISERVICESI
I  I  |WATER  II  I
OCCUPATION  \  I  I  I  I  I  I  i  I  TOTAL
-_________________,________.________.________,________.________,________,___--___
PROFESSIONAL  1lA 9.52  1  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  1  42.86  1  47.62  I  21
2/  5.88  1  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  60.00  1  23.81  !  13.21
GOVERNMENT  I  50.00  I  0.00  1  16.67  1  0.00  i  16.67  I  0.00  I  16.67  6
AOMINISTRATION  I  8.82  1  0.00  I  11.11  I  0.00  i  5.88  0.00  1  2.38  1  3.77
…________________+________*--------  ----------------  _-----------------  _-------
CLERtCAL  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  1  20.00  1  0.00  i  40.00  i  40.00  5
I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  2.50  1  0.00  13.33  1  4.76  1  3.14
…________________  --------  ,_-----------------  _-----------------------------------
SALES  VENOORS  I  0.00  I  0.00  0.00  1  97.44  1  0.00  1  2.56  0.00  1  39
I  0.00 I  0.00  0.00 i  95.00 1  0.00 1  6.67  0.00 1  24.53
SERVtCE  WORKERS  |  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  10.00  I  0.00  !  30.00  1  60.00  1  '0
I  0.00  I  0.00  I  0.00  I  2.S0  1  0.00  1  20.00  I  '4 29  6.29
PRODUCTION  TRANS  I  37.18  1  2.56  !  10.26  1  0.00  1  20.51  1  0.00  i  29.49  1  78
PORTATtON  WRKR  I  85.29 I  100.00 1  88.89 1  0.00 1  94.12 1  0.00 !  54.76 1  49.06
…________________,________,________,________.________.________,________-  ________,
TOTAL  34  2  9  40  17  iS  42  159
21.38  1.26  5.66  25.16  10.69  9.43  26.42  100.00
MOTES:  I/  ROW  PERCENT
2/  COLUMN  PERCENT- 51  -
ANNEX C
Table  C-1
Wage Functions  for  Ware  Workers
OLS  and  Selectivity  Adjusted
Selectivity  Adjusted  Simple  OLS
Independent  With  Without  With  Without
variables  Training Training  Both  Training Training Both
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (3)
Constant  0.255  -0.345*  0.353*  0.254  -0.343* -0.356*
(0.37)  (2.33)  (2.48)  (0.40)  (2.30)  (2.52)
Potential  experience  0.034*  0.039*  0.038*  0.041*  0.039*  0.040*
(1.93)  (4.77)  (5.27)  (2.33)  (4.93)  (5.76)
Potential  experience  -0.0004  -0.0004*  -0.0004*  -0.0004  -0.0004*  -0.0004*
squared  (1.05)  (3.12)  (3.41)  (1.15)  (3.14)  (3.62)
Tenure  on current  job  0.071*  0.032*  0.038*  0.066*  0.032*  0.036*
(3.43)  (3.58)  (4.84)  (3.13)  (3.74)  (4.62)
Tenure  on current  job  -0.002*  -0.0007*  -0.0009*  -0.002*  -0.0007*  -0.0008*
squared  (2.46)  (2.92)  (3.79)  (2.31)  (2.97)  (3.59)
Spline  primary  0.063  0.076*  0.080*  0.067  0.076*  0.080*
(0.50)  (2.54)  (2.78)  (0.52)  (2.56)  (2.79)
Spline  secondary  0.058  0.062*  0.059*  0.102*  0.062*  0.071*
(1.46)  (3.51)  (3.91)  (3.38)  4.62)  (5.88)
Spline  higher  0.131*  0.115*  0.119*  0.130*  0.116*  0.117*
(5.47)  (6.67)  (8.54)  (5.26)  (6.65)  (8.37)
Last  school  attended  -0.108  -0.051  -0.060  -0.137  -0.050  -0.074
was  public  (1.06)  (0.70)  (1.01)  (1.32)  (0.71)  (1.25)
Father's  years  of  0.007  0.035*  0.028*  0.008  0.035*  0.028*
schooling  (0.55)  (4.34)  (4.14)  (0.62)  (4.32)  (4.20)
Mother's  years  of  0.009  0.027*  0.021*  0.009  0.026*  0.022*
schooling  (0.64)  (3.04)  (2.92)  (0.68)  (3.01)  (2.93)
Married  or  as if  0.133  0.200*  0.176*  0.134  0.201*  0.173*
(1.37)  (3.19)  (3.33)  (1.33)  (3.16)  (-27)
Lima  0.281*  0.141*  0.162*  0.293*  0.140*  0.170*
(3.20)  (2.96)  (3.90)  (3.24)  (3.00)  (4.10)- 52 -
Lambda  (X)  -0.229  0.0008 -0.132
(1.61)  (0.06)  (1.38)
Training  dummy  0.135*  0.128*
(2.*13)  (2.64)
R2 adjusted  0.332  0.376  0.382  0.328  0.375  0.380
Mean  depend.  variable  1.646  1.322  1.398  1.646  1.322  1.398
No.  observations  294  965  1,259  294  965  1,259
Notes: *  Statistically  significant  at  the  10  percent  level  or better.
t-values  in  parentheses.- 53 -
Table  C-2
Wage  Functions  for  Wage  Workers:
Interactive  Models
Independent  Model  Model
variables  (1)  (2)
Constant  -0.259*  -0.244*
(1.81)  (1.71)
Potential  experience  0.042*  0.039*
(5.78)  (5.48)
Potential  experience  -0.0005*  -0.0004*
squared  (3.92)  (3.60)
Tenure  on current  job  0.032*  0.031*
(3.89)  (3.92)
Tenure  on current  job  -0.0005*  -0.0005*
squared  (2.28)  (2.28)
Spline  primary  0.065*  0.065*
(2.28)  (2.25)
Spline  secondary  0.067*  0.068*
(5.26)  (5.43)
Spline  higher  0.124*  0.123*
(7.96)  (7.92)
Last  school  attended  -0.100*  -0.081
was  public  (1.68)  (1.36)
Father's  years  of  0.030*  0.030*
schooling  (4.43)  (4.37)
Mother's  years  of  0.023*  0.024*
schooling  (3.13)  (3.25)
Married  or as if  0.168*  0.178*
(3.16)  (3.32)
Lima  0.198*  0.191*
(4.74)  (4.58)
Training  dummy  0.034_ 54 -
Secondary  *  training  -0.012
(0.07)
Higher  *  training  0.017
(0.09)
Potential  experience  0.004
*  training  (0.24)
Potential  experience  -0.00002
squared  *  training  (0.53)
Tenure  *  training  0.028
(1.31)
Tenure  squared  *  -0.001
training  (1.47)
Job  based  training  0.227
(JBP)  (0.76)
Post-secondary  -0.739
training  (PST)  (0.83)
Academe  training  -0.705
(ACT)  (1.50)
Secondary  *  JBP  -0.096
(0.46)
Higher  *  JBP  0.142
(0.62)
Potential  experience  -0.026
*  JBP  (1.04)
Potential  experience  0.0005
squared  *  JBP  (0.90)
Tenure  *  JBP  0.083*
(2.65)
Tenure  squared  *  JBP  -0.003*
(2.62)
Secondary  *  PST  -0.475
(0.53)
Higher  *  PST  (0.014*
(1.68)- 55 -
Potential  experience  0.053
*  PST  (1.15)
Potential  experience  -0.008
squared  *  PST  (0.62)
Tenure  *  PST  -0.022
(0.38)
Tenure  squared  *  PST  -0.002
(0.74)
Secondary  *  ACT  0.195
(0.51)
Higher  *  ACT  0.010
(0.26)
Potential  experience  0.077*
*  ACT  (2.24)
Potential  experience  -0.001*
squared  *  ACT  (2.05)
Tenure  *  ACT  -0.022
(0.53)
Tenure  squared  *  ACT  -0.001
(0.50)
R2 adjusted  0.388  0.391
No.  observations  1,259  1,259
Notes: Statistically  significant  at the  10  percent  level  or  better.
t-values  in  parentheses.- 56 -
Table  C-3
wage  Functions  for  Self-employed  Workers
OLS  and  Selectivity  Adjusted
Selectivity  Adjusted  Simole  OLS
Independent  With  Without  Pooled With  Without  Pooled
variables  Training  Training Sample Training Training Sample
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -0.114  0.053  0.032  0.164  -0.092  -0.342
(0.18)  (0.25)  (0.16)  (0.37)  (0.44)  (0.17)
Potential  experience  0.049*  0.039*  0.038*  0.050*  0.038*  0.037*
(1.79)  (3.99)  (4.22)  (1.71)  (3.76)  (4.07)
Potential  experience -0.080  -0.060*  -0.060* -0.080  -0.060*  -0.060*
squared  (/100)  (1.21)  (3.76)  (3.89)  (1.23)  (3.59)  (3.79)
Tenure  on current  job -0.008  0.008  0.005  -0.030  0.014  0.009
(0.24)  (0.81)  (0.60)  (0.09)  (1.42)  (0.96)
Tenure  on  current  job -0.02  0.004  0.009  -0.040  -0.060  0.003
squared  (/100)  (0.23)  (0.16)  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.24)  (0.13)
Spline  primary  a/  0.039  0.036  a/  0.047  0.040
(1.17)  (1.10)  (1.40)  (1.20)
Spline  secondary  0.031  0.083*  0.064*  0.012  0.057*  0.051*
(0.56)  (3.91)  (3.39)  (0.25)  (3.08)  (2.95)
Spline  higher  0.081*  0.058*  0.073*  0.075*  0.057*  0.067*
(1.87)  (2.50)  (3.50)  (1.70)  (2.14)  (3.21)
Last  school  attended -0.038  -0.102  -0.073  -0.023  -0.068  -0.001
was  public  (0.20)  (1.02)  (0.82)  (0.12)  (0.67)  (0.02)
Father's  years  of  0.014  0.009  0.008  0.012  0.006  -0.049
schooling  (0.58)  (0.82)  (0.79)  (0.48)  (0.56)  (0.55)
Mother's  years  of  0.048*  0.025*  0.028*  0.046  0.024*  0.007
schooling  (1.76)  (2.10)  (2.52)  (1.63)  (1.97)  (0.64)
Lives  in  Lima  dummy  0.110  0.118*  0.124*  0.101  0.098  0.027*
(0.76)  (1.86)  (2.13)  (0.06)  (1.53)  (2.41)
Total  capital  of  0.069*  0.054*  0.056*  0.069*  0.053*  0.111*
enterprise  (/1,000)  (2.67)  (4.98)  (5.59)  (2.57)  (4.80)  (1.90)- 57 -
Number  hired  workers  0.054  0.021*  0.023*  0.57  0.023*  0.056*
in  enterpriso  (1.36)  (1.91)  (2.23)  (1.38)  (2.09)  (5.52)
Number  family  workers  -0.261*  -0.003  -0.033  -0.253* -0.001  0.025*
in  enterprise  (3.14)  (0.11)  (1.24)  (2.92)  (0.04)  (2.34)
Training  dummy  -0.450  -0.003
(1.56)  (1.12)
0.165  0.563*  0.266
(0.59)  (2.45)  (1.62)
R2 adjusted  0.209  0.168  0.171  0.213  0.163  0.170
Nean  dependent  1.492  1.383  1.402  1.402  1.402  1.402
variable
No.  observations  159  766  925  159  766  925
Notes: *  Statistically  significant  at the  10 percent  level  or better.
t-values  in  parentheses.




Mean  Sample  Characteristics  of One-Worker  Business
Characteristics  With  Without
Training  Training
No.  of observations  49  282
Lima  31  120
Other  Urban  Areas  18  152
Age  32.0  41.5
(9.7)  (12.4)
Years  of schooling  10.4  7.0
(2.8)  (3.7)
School  last  attended  0.73  0.86
was  public
Father's  years  of  5.3  4.2
schooling
Mother's  years  of  3.5  2.6
schooling
Father's  job farmer  0.20  0.42
Ever  migrated  0.65  0.78
Potential  work  15.2  28.2
experience  (years)  (10.3)  (12.6)
Job  specific  5.9  12.1
experience  (years)  (6.0)  (11.0)
Real  hourly  wage rate  5.97  5.60
(intis  June 1986)  (4.3)  (5.4)
Usual  weekly  hours  45.9  47.1
worked  (20.6)  (21.1)
Months  worked  8.3  10.1
last  12 months  (4.5)  (3.5)
Enterprise  total  8,597  8,465
capital  (intis  June 1986)  (18,421)  (19,248)
Mobile  enterprise  0.55  0.55- 59  -
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